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I. INTRODUCTION 
For thousands of years, stratospheric ozone has shielded life on 
earth from harmful ultraviolet light. In the last three decades, hu-
manity has released enough chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) into the 
atmosphere to cause the almost total destruction of ozone above 
Antarctica during its winter months (the so-called Antarctic ozone 
hole) and the loss of significant amounts of global ozone at the mid-
latitudes. Moreover, the CFCs already in the atmosphere will remain 
there destroying ozone for the next one hundred years. 
We are at a crisis point. We must act now to reduce the depletion 
of ozone in the future. Despite the urgency of the situation, however, 
nations, including the United States, have been slow to act. 
This Article, after preliminarily outlining the scientific nature of 
the problem and the attempts at regulation prior to 1985, focuses on 
the provisions of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (the Protocol) and the final United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations issued to im-
plement the Protocol. The operation and impact of the Protocol's 
scheme provide a necessary foundation for reviewing EPA's regu-
lations. This Article then reviews the EPA regulations, not merely 
for compliance with the Protocol, but in light of the regulations' 
advantages and disadvantages, the available alternatives, and EPA's 
role under the Clean Air Act. Finally, this Article takes a hard look 
at the adequacy of both the Protocol and the EPA regulations, taking 
into account the most recent scientific evidence and the debate over 
unilateral United States action. 
II. THE CFC PROBLEM 
A. Chlorofluorocarbons 
New technologies developed to serve one beneficial purpose iron-
ically often have unintended, unanticipated, and unsuspected con-
sequences with potentially disastrous results. Such technologies 
have yielded a multitude of adverse environmental consequences as 
we approach the twenty-first century. CFC and halon emissions 
provide a classic example of these problems. 
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CFCs are a subcategory of halocarbons, which are compounds of 
carbon and one or more halogens (fluorine, chlorine, bromine or 
iodine). Unlike other halocarbons, CFCs contain both chlorine and 
fluorine and may also contain hydrogen. 1 Halons are compounds 
containing bromine and are produced in much smaller quantities than 
CFCS.2 Both are man-made and do not occur naturally. 3 
CFCs are chemically stable, non-corrosive, non-flammable, non-
toxic chemicals. 4 Their superior thermodynamic properties have re-
sulted in more efficient refrigeration and widespread use. Their use 
in aerosols began during World War II after researchers at the 
United States Department of Agriculture found that dispersal of 
insecticides as fine aerosols greatly increased effectiveness. 5 Subse-
quently, personal care products using aerosol applications developed 
into large markets. 6 
In the 1960s, two significant new uses that greatly expanded 
production of CFCs were created. CFC-ll was used to make plastic 
foams and CFC-12 was used for automobile air conditioning. Most 
recently, CFC-1l3 has been used as a solvent in the manufacture of 
electronic components and computer chips,7 and halons have been 
used primarily in hand-held and total flooding fire extinguishers. 8 
I THE ECONOMICS OF MANAGING CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND 
CLIMATE ISSUES 3 (J. Cumberland, J. Hibbs, & I. Hoch eds. 1982) [hereinafter THE Eco-
NOMICS]; see 42 U.S.C. § 7452(1) (1982). Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are best known under 
DuPont's trade name, "freon." They have been widely used in aerosol spray cans, air condi-
tioning and refrigeration, foams used for cushioning, insulation, and packaging, and as indus-
trial solvents. They also are a blowing agent used to make such things as foam cups, trays, 
and egg cartons. WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
STITUTIONS 153 (V. Nanda ed. 1983) [hereinafter WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE]. 
2 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,491 (1987) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). Bromine is more ozone-destructive than chlorine. It 
reacts catalytically with ozone, and also can interact synergistically with chlorine to consume 
ozone. On a pound-for-pound basis, halons pose a two and one-half to twelve and one-half 
times greater threat to deplete ozone than do CFCs. EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, 
ASSESSING THE RISKS OF TRACE GASES THAT CAN MODIFY THE STRATOSPHERE 3-5 (1987) 
[hereinafter ASSESSING THE RISKS]; Turco, Stratospheric Ozone Perturbations, in OZONE IN 
THE FREE ATMOSPHERE 195,203 (1985); see also L. DOTTO & H. SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR 
188 (1978) [hereinafter THE OZONE WAR]. For this reason, halons are included with the more 
abundant CFCs in the Montreal Protocol and EPA's proposed regulation. 
3 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 3-3. 
4 Forziati, The Fluorocarbon Problem, in THE ECONOMICS, supra note I, at 40-4l. 
5 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, FLUOROCARBONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON 
INADVERTENT MODIFICATION OF THE STRATOSPHERE 77 (1975) [hereinafter FLUOROCARBONS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. 
6 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 3-7. 
7Id. 
SId. at 3-5. 
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Production of these ozone-depleting substances is expected to in-
crease in the future. CFC-ll and CFC-12, for example, constitute 
over eighty percent of current worldwide production.9 Combined 
production of CFC-ll and CFC-12 grew at an average rate of 8.7 
percent from 1960 to 1974,10 peaking in 1974. 11 Although declines in 
aerosol use resulted in global reduction between 1976 and 1984, by 
1986 total CFC-ll and CFC-12 production was nearly as much as 
that in 1974. 12 Studies project average rates of production growth 
for CFC-ll and CFC-12 over the next sixty-five years ranging from 
0.2 percent to 4.7 percent,13 with CFC-1l3 production growing at a 
faster rate. 14 Unlike CFCs, annual production ofhalons has remained 
relatively steady at 20,000 kilograms.15 
B. Atmospheric Ozone 
The earth's atmosphere consists of three layers. They are, in 
ascending order, the troposphere, stratosphere, and mesosphere. 16 
The air temperature becomes cooler with increasing altitude to a 
minimum of about minus eighty degrees Fahrenheit, and then be-
comes warmer. 17 In the troposphere, cold air is above the warm air. 18 
Because the cold air is denser, it tends to sink, while the warm air 
tends to rise. Thus, there is a good deal of vertical mixing in the 
troposphere. 19 
In contrast, the stratosphere is a stable, virtually cloudless region. 
Lying above the troposphere, the stratosphere has slow vertical 
circulation because the denser, cooler air is at lower altitudes and 
9Id. at 3-3. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. (total global CFC-ll and CFC-12 production peaked in 1974 at over 700 million 
kilograms). 
12Id. 
13Id. at 3-4. 
14Id. 
15Id. at 3-5. 
16 Forziati, supra note 4, at 42. 
17 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HALOCARBONS: EFFECTS ON STRATOSPHERIC OZONE 
21 (1976) [hereinafter HALOCARBONS]. This temperature minimum is known as the tropopause. 
Id. 
18 THE OZONE WAR, supra note 2, at 34. 
19Id. The stratosphere lies above the troposphere. In the stratosphere, the temperature 
rises from its minimum at the tropopause to a maximum of about 50 degrees Fahrenheit at 
the stratopause. HALOCARBONS, supra note 17, at 21; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7452(2) (1982). In 
the stratosphere, the temperature rises from its minimum at the tropopause to a maximum 
of about fifty degrees Farenheit at the stratopause. 
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does not readily rise. 20 Transfer of gases between the troposphere 
and stratosphere is limited. 21 
Although ozone constitutes one of the gases in the stratosphere, 
it exists in very small amounts, only a few parts per million. 22 In 
fact, if all stratospheric ozone existed in a single layer at sea-level 
pressure, it would be no more than 0.3 centimeters thick. 23 Yet this 
thin and scattered band of ozone molecules is absolutely essential to 
the existence of life on the earth's surface because of its capacity to 
absorb ultraviolet radiation. 24 
Ultraviolet radiation causes sunburn, skin cancer, and other bio-
logical effects, including alteration of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
the material that carries the genetic information of living cells. 25 
Ultraviolet radiation reaches the atmosphere in a range of varying 
wavelengths. The shorter the wavelength, the greater the harm 
caused by the radiation. 26 Ozone in the stratosphere destroys almost 
all of the most destructive radiation and most of the less destructive 
radiation. 27 Consequently, relatively little harmful ultraviolet radia-
tion has been reaching the earth's surface. 28 
C. CFCs in the Atmosphere 
Because CFCs are gases at room temperature, production of CFCs 
eventually translates into emissions into the atmosphere. 29 Aerosol 
20 HALOCARBONS, supra note 17, at 2l. 
21 Forziati, supra note 4, at 43. 
22 HALOCARBONS, supra note 17, at 22. 
23 THE OZONE WAR, supra note 2, at 26. 
24 Id. Moreover, ozone is responsible for the heating of the atmosphere above the tropopause, 
and therefore is linked to the dynamic state of the atmosphere and finally to the terrestrial 
climate. See STRATOSPHERIC OZONE REDUCTION, SOLAR ULTRAVIOLET RADIATION AND 
PLANT LIFE 1 (R. Worrest & M. Caldwell eds. 1983). 
25 Forziati, supra note 4, at 43-44; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CAUSES AND 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE: UPDATE 1983 198-204 (1984) [hereinafter 
CAUSES AND EFFECTS]. Ultraviolet radiation wavelengths of 290 to 320 nanometers (1 nm = 
10-9 m) known as UV-B is largely responsible for these effects. Forziati, supra note 4, at 44. 
26 Forziati, supra note 4, at 44. The DNA-altering effectiveness of ultraviolet radiation 
increases by a factor of about 5,000 from 320 nm to 290 nm. Id. Thus, even a small increase 
in 290 nm radiation may be more significant biologically than a large increase at 320 nm. 
27 See id. Damaging radiation in the 290 nm to 320 nm wavelengths is partially absorbed by 
the stratospheric ozone. Radiation of wavelengths from 240 nm to 290 nm is almost completely 
absorbed by the stratospheric ozone. Radiation between 190 nm and 240 nm wavelengths is 
absorbed by molecular oxygen before it reaches the high stratosphere. Id. 
28 Id. 
29 THE ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 5. Rc~ent measurements of atmospheric gases affecting 
ozone reveal annual growth in concentrations of CFC-11 (5%), CFC-12 (5%), CFC-13 (10%), 
and halon 1211 (23%). ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 2-9 to 2-10. 
536 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:531 
use of CFCs results in immediate release to the atmosphere. Use of 
CFCs for refrigerants or foam-blowing delays emissions; however, 
leakage occurs and eventually the disposal of the product will release 
the CFCS.30 
Once in the atmosphere, CFCs remain there despite the tropo-
sphere's "sinks," natural removal processes which cleanse the air. 31 
Precipitation is the most common sink. The troposphere can cleanse 
itself of pollutants in about one week. 32 There are no significant 
natural tropospheric sinks, however, for CFCS.33 The Federal Task 
Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere concluded in 
1975 that the amount of CFCs in the oceans, soil, subsurface ground-
water, and polar icecaps was insignificant. 34 The stability that made 
CFCs ideal for their original purposes permits them to remain inert 
in the troposphere. 35 Thus, CFCs, with lifetimes of up to 120 years, 
accumulate in the troposphere and eventually migrate to the strato-
sphere. 36 
The amount of ozone in the stratosphere is normally maintained 
in relative equilibrium as a result of a dynamic balance between 
formation and destruction processes. 37 Ozone is formed when ultra-
violet radiation breaks molecular oxygen (02) into oxygen atoms (0), 
the latter then combining with molecular oxygen to form ozone. 38 
30 THE OZONE WAR, supra note 2, at 230; HALOCARBONS, supra note 17, at 57-59. 
31 See T. STOEL JR., A. MILLER, & B. MILROY, FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, AN INTER-
NATIONAL COMPARISON 10 (1980) [hereinafter FLUOROCARBON REGULATION]; Forziati, supra 
note 4, at 42. 
32 THE OZONE WAR, supra note 2, at 34. 
33 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 10; FLUOROCARBONS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 5, at 7. In the early and mid-1970s, government and industry searched 
for such sinks but did not find any. Prior to recognition of the ozone problem, this absence of 
sinks was considered beneficial because CFCs could otherwise be classified as a pollutant. The 
ozone issue turned the tables but no sink was ever identified. See THE OZONE WAR, supra 
note 2, at 230-42. 
34 FLUOROCARBONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 7. 
35 THE ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 1. In addition, during the long period when the CFCs 
reside in the troposphere, they contribute to the "greenhouse effect" by absorbing emissions 
of infrared radiation from the surface of the earth. Id. 
36 EPA, CFCs AND STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, 1 (1987); Forziati, supra note 4, at 41; HALO-
CARBONS, supra note 17, at 27-28. As early as 1975, CFCs were detected in the stratosphere. 
FLUOROCARBONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 7. 
37 HALOCARBONS, supra note 17, at 22. 
38 Id. at 22-23. Where hv is harmful ultraviolet radiation, this process may be represented 
as follows: 
O2 + hv ~ 0 + 0 
o + O2 + M ~ 03 + M (twice) 
NET 302~ 203 
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Ozone is destroyed when it absorbs damaging ultraviolet radiation 
(DUV). DUV causes an oxygen atom to dissociate. 39 Dissociation of 
the oxygen atom is not a true destruction process because almost all 
freed oxygen atoms quickly recombine with molecular oxygen to 
again form ozone. 40 
Once CFCs reach the middle and upper stratosphere, the ozone 
layer no longer shields them from ultraviolet radiation. As a result, 
ultraviolet radiation breaks down the CFCs, thereby releasing chlor-
ine atoms, or bromine atoms in the case of halons. 41 The chlorine 
and bromine released in the stratosphere catalyze the destruction 
process, repeatedly combining with and breaking apart ozone mol-
ecules, resulting in a net decrease in the stratospheric ozone con-
tent. 42 
D. Health and Environmental Impacts 
Decreases in ozone would permit greater penetration of damaging 
ultraviolet radiation to the earth's surface. 43 EPA estimates that 
such penetration would adversely affect humans and the environ-
ment as follows: 
(1) The cumulative increase in lifetime exposure to DUV that 
individuals would experience could increase the incidence of non-
melanoma cancers.44 EPA estimates 153,587,100 additional cases of 
such cancers in the United States by the year 2075 if CFCs are not 
controlled. 45 The number of cases would shrink to 3,694,900 if halon 
production is frozen at current levels and CFC production is reduced 
by fifty percent. 46 In either case, EPA expects the increase in non-
39Id. at 23. The process may be represented as: 
0 3 + hv -4 O2 + 0 
4°Id. 
41 Id. at 28, 61. Ultraviolet radiation at wavelengths of 200 nm causes such a breakdown of 
CFCs. 
42 FLUOROCARBONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 8; FLUOROCARBON REGU-
LATION, supra note 31, at 8; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DE-
PLETION BY HALOCARBONS: CHEMISTRY AND TRANSPORT 9 (1979); CFCs AND STRATO-
SPHERIC OZONE, supra note 36, at 1. 
43 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 2-11. 
44Id. at 7-1; see also CAUSES AND EFFECTS, supra note 25, at 164-67. 
45 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-4. This figure assumes nonwhites would not be 
affected. 
46Id. A one-percent decrease in stratospheric ozone has been estimated to cause a two-
percent increase in DUV, which in turn translates into a four-percent increase in the rate of 
human skin cancer. THE ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 5. Other estimates conclude that the 
ratio may be as high as an <eight-percent increase in skin cancers for each one-percent decrease 
in ozone. FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 12. 
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melanoma skin cancers to increase mortality as well, with most of 
the additional deaths occurring in later generations. 47 
(2) Similarly, increased D UV could cause increased incidence of 
mortality from melanoma skin cancer, most cases occurring in later 
generations and most deaths from such melanomas occurring in peo-
ple not yet born. 48 
(3) Epidemiological studies have identified a correlation between 
the prevalence of cataracts in humans and the flux of ultraviolet 
radiation reaching the earth's surface. EPA estimates that, for each 
one percent-increase in DUV, there will be a one-half of one percent 
increase in cataracts, the majority of cases occurring in people not 
yet born.49 
(4) Increased DUV could have a detrimental effect on human and 
animal immune systems. DUV reduces the ability of the immune 
system to respond to antigens, thereby potentially reducing one's 
capacity to respond to infectious diseases or prevent the develop-
ment of tumors. 50 All populations would be at risk, but those already 
immunosuppressed could be at greater risk. 51 
(5) DUV can penetrate more than five feet into unclear water and 
more than twenty feet into clear water. Such radiation causes de-
creases in fecundity, growth, survival, and other functions of a va-
riety of marine organisms, including organisms essential to the 
aquatic food chain. 52 
(6) Increased DUV has the potential to affect agricultural crops 
and other terrestrial ecosystems. 53 
47 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-2. 
48 [d. at 7-2, 7-11; see also CAUSES AND EFFECTS, supra note 25, at 168-90. 
49 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-11; see also CAUSES AND EFFECTS, supra note 
25, at 144--B3. 
50 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-11, 7-24. 
51 [d. at 7-24. There is evidence that immunosuppression could result from much lower 
doses of DUV than those required for carcinogenesis. Exposures to ultraviolet radiation 
insufficient to cause a sunburn may decrease the ability of the human immune system to 
defend against skin infection or neoplastic skin cells. [d. 
52 [d.; see also CAUSES AND EFFECTS, supra note 25, at 218-25. Currently, EPA has 
insufficient scientific evidence to estimate the amount of damage that would occur in the 
natural environment for a given increase in DUV. ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-
25. Experiments have indicated that increased ultraviolet radiation may inhibit the photosyn-
thesis of phytoplankton by as much as 50%. FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 
13. 
53 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-25. A number of studies on various crops have 
demonstrated that DUV adversely affects crop yield and quality. [d.; see also CAUSES AND 
EFFECTS, supra note 25, at 206-16. Field studies of soybeans have shown that ozone depletion 
of 25% could decrease the yield of soybeans by over 20%, with substantially greater reductions 
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(7) Increased ultraviolet radiation reaching the troposphere can 
cause increased amounts of tropospheric ozone. 54 Ozone in the tro-
posphere adversely affects human health, agricultural crops, forests, 
and certain materials. 55 
(8) Ultraviolet radiation tends to degrade polymers by affecting 
their mechanical and optical properties. 56 
(9) Increased concentration of CFCs is a factor that will contribute 
to global warming and, consequently, to a rise in the level of the 
seas. 57 Increases in sea levels will flood coastal wetlands and low-
lands, accelerate coastal erosion, and increase the salinity of estu-
aries and aquifers. 58 
These impacts relate to every aspect of our quality of life: our 
health, life expectancy, food supply, and climate. Their occurrence 
can only lower the standard of living for future generations, a vil-
lainous legacy. 
III. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
A. Aerosols 
The destruction of stratospheric ozone by CFCs was first hypoth-
esized in 1974.59 That same year, congressional hearings addressed 
the possibility of United States governmental restriction of CFCs 
for the first time,60 but Congress took no action on either of two bills 
addressing the problem. 61 It was the consumers who turned away 
from aerosol products and flooded Congress with letters of concern 
that provided the impetus to reduce use of CFCs in aerosols,62 then 
the major use of CFCS.63 As a result of consumer pressure, for 
in years when climatic stresses are also a factor. CFCs AND STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, supra 
note 36, at 2. 
54 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-28. Ozone is a criteria pollutant regulated 
under sections 108, 109, and 110 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (1982). 
55 ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2, at 7-30. Materials include elastomers, textile fibers 
and dyes, and certain paints. Id. 
56Id. at 7-33. 
57Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Molina & Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom Cata-
lyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). 
6() EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROTECTION OF 
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE 3-1 (1987) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS]. 
61 Brodeur, Annals of Chemistry: In the Face of Doubt, NEW YORKER, June 9,1986, at 70, 
73. 
62Id. at 70; see also REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 3-1. 
63 Brodeur, supra note 61, at 73. 
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example, Oregon banned the sale of spray cans containing CFCs, 
and N ew York passed legislation requiring such products to carry a 
warning label. 64 
In the winter of 1975-76, a draft of the National Academy of 
Sciences' task force report, "Fluorocarbons and the Environment," 
was circulated for review. The task force report affirmed the poten-
tial for stratospheric harm. 65 By 1976, EPA, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC) began considering regulations to restrict the use of 
CFCs in aerosols.66 Three separate sets of regulations resulted. 
On May 13, 1977, FDA proposed regulations pursuant to the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).67 These regulations 
generally prohibited use of CFCs as aerosol propellants in food, 
drug, medical device, or cosmetic products manufactured or pack-
aged after December 15, 1978.68 Finished products introduced into 
interstate commerce after April 15, 1979 also had to comply regard-
less of when they were manufactured or packaged. 69 In 1974, such 
products accounted for about eighty percent of CFCs used in aero-
sols. 70 
The remaining CFC propellants in aerosols are regulated by the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).71 With certain exceptions not 
pertinent to CFCs, TSCA grants EPA authority to regulate any 
chemical substance or mixture that presents an unreasonable risk of 
injury to health or to the environment. 72 Pursuant to this authority, 
on May 13, 1977 EPA proposed regulations to prohibit all manufac-
ture, processing, and distribution in interstate commerce of CFCs 
for nonessential uses in aerosol propellants. 73 This rule became ef-
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 3-1. 
67 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-337 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This Act prohibits (1) the manufacture or 
sale of any "adulterated" food or cosmetic, or (2) the introduction into interstate commerce of 
any new drug that has not received "new drug" approval. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986). 
66 21 C.F.R. § 2.125 (1988). Certain specified uses were deemed essential and were therefore 
exempted from the prohibitions. 
69Id. 
70 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 55. 
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Pesticides, tobacco, foods, food additives, 
drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and certain nuclear material may not be regulated under 
TSCA. 15 U.S.C. § 2602 (1982). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982). 
73 Toxic Substances Control Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,542 (1977) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 702-
799 (1987». 
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fective on October 15, 1978. 74 The FDA and EPA each issued a set 
of regulations under separate statutes, coordinating their require-
ments so there would be no regulatory gap. If a CFC is not a TSCA 
chemical, it is an FDCA substance, and vice versa. 75 
Other sovereigns also responded. Belgium, Canada, Norway, and 
Sweden banned CFC use as aerosol propellants. 76 Australia reduced 
aerosol use of CFCs by sixty-six percent. 77 Member nations of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) reduced CFC use in aerosols 
by thirty percent from 1976 levels, and agreed not to increase their 
CFC production capacity. Portugal banned CFC production and es-
tablished import quotas. Brazil implemented a production capacity 
cap.78 Some states also enacted legislation to restrict the use of CFCs 
in aerosols.79 Although these measures limiting CFCs in aerosols 
resulted in a decrease in CFC emissions, increasing use of CFCs for 
other purposes has offset these gains. The further reductions now 
needed must come from nonaerosol uses. 
B. Clean Air Act 
At the time of these aerosol regulations, EPA rejected the Clean 
Air Act as a basis for regulating CFCS,80 even though the Act's 
purpose was to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air. 
Because the Clean Air Act operates primarily through ambient air 
quality standards and state plans to achieve them, EPA could not 
readily apply the Act to CFCS.81 The use of ambient standards to 
regulate CFCs would render attainment schedules, monitoring re-
quirements, and other provisions of the Act meaningless, and pro-
74 40 C.F.R. pt. 762 (1987). 
75 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 54; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 11,320 (1978). 
The CPSC published a final rule on August 24, 1977, requiring that aerosol products subject 
to the Consumer Product Safety Act that contain CFC propellants carry a warning label as 
of February 20, 1978. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,017 (1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.17, 369.21, 
501.17, 505.10, 740.11, 801.425 (1988)). The Consumer Product Safety Act is codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
76 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 3-4. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. 
79 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 57. Further regulation of the use of 
CFCs at the state level is restricted by TSCA. TSCA allows state action only if such action 
is more stringent than federal regulation and if the effect does not unduly burden interstate 
commerce. [d. 
8() 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7508 (1982). 
81 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 55; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 
(1982). 
542 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:531 
duce a strained extension of the Act's intended scope.82 In addition, 
EPA rejected as impractical the use of the Clean Air Act's emer-
gency powers to take action against any imminent and substantial 
endangerments to health. 83 
In contrast, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act provided 
EPA with specific authority to regulate substances that adversely 
affect stratospheric ozone. 84 The amendments required EPA to study 
the cumulative effects of all substances, practices, processes, and 
activities on the stratosphere, particularly the ozone, and to report 
to Congress by August 7, 1979.85 The amendments further provided 
that, upon submission of this report, the Administrator of EPA: 
shall propose regulations for the control of any substance, prac-
tice, process, or activity (or any combination thereof) which in 
his judgment may reasonably be anticipated to affect the strato-
sphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such effect in the 
stratosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare. Such regulations shall take into account the 
feasibility and the costs of achieving such control. 86 
This provision granted EPA broad authority to regulate whenever, 
in the Administrator's judgment, a substance, practice, process, or 
activity could reasonably be anticipated to affect the ozone so as to 
endanger public health or welfare. The law does not require a finding 
that such harm has occurred, nor does it specify how the Adminis-
trator shall regulate. 87 
Pursuant to its new authority, on October 7, 1980 EPA issued an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Ozone-Depleting Chlo-
rofluorocarbons: Proposed Production Restriction."88 The proposed 
82 FLUOROCARBON REGULATION, supra note 31, at 55. 
&'lId. EPA concluded: 
ld. 
First, it would make the courts, rather than the agency, the initial triers of fact, 
and it was assumed that courts would be reluctant to ban a product unless presented 
with very strong evidence. Second, the provision applies only to health threats; 
environmental impacts of fluorocarbon use could not be considered. 
84 42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (1982). The amendments specifically provided that the regulations 
proposed under TSCA prior to the enactment of amendments were not to be affected. 42 
U.S.C. § 7458 (1982). 
85 ld. §§ 7453-7455. 
86 ld. § 7457(b). 
87 Compare this provision with TSCA provisions which authorize regulation of substances 
that pose an unreasonable risk to health and the environment. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982). The 
TSCA unreasonable risk standard appears more onerous than a standard of reasonable antic-
ipation of effects which may reasonably be anticipated to produce a risk. 
86 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (1980). 
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rule would have applied to nonaerosol uses of CFCs, freezing the 
level of emissions of ozone-depleting compounds by mandated engi-
neering controls and market-based controls.89 The rule was never 
finalized. In 1983, EPA advised Congress that significant gaps ex-
isted in understanding the relationship between CFCs and ozone 
depletion and that EPA had no immediate plans to regulate CFCs 
further. 90 
This inaction prompted the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) to file suit against EPA.91 NRDC contended that the Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was a determination that 
CFC emissions endangered public health and the environment, thus 
triggering the Administrator's nondiscretionary duty under the 
Clean Air Act for the Administrator to issue regulations to control 
the emissions. 92 The parties settled, with EPA agreeing to publish 
proposed regulations or present a basis for deciding to take no action 
by May 1, 1987.93 Faced with a court order to take some action, EPA 
announced its Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan. 94 The Plan called 
for greater research, analysis, and emphasis on the United States' 
participation in international discussions of global strategies for pro-
tecting the ozone layer,95 a policy that remains the cornerstone of 
EPA's approach. 
C. United Nations Environmental Program 
The protection of stratospheric ozone is a global concern. The 
tropospheric lifetimes of CFCs and halons result in wide dispersion 
of emissions. Thus, the release of CFCs in one nation will affect the 
stratosphere above another nation. 96 Because of the global nature of 
89Id. 
90 Scientific Uncertainty Warrants Delay in CFC Regulation, EPA Tells Congress, 7 Chern. 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 456 (1983). 
91 NRDC Sues to Require EPA to Issue Rules Limiting Emissions of Chlorofluorocarbons, 
15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1384 (1984). 
92 See id. 
93 NRDC v. Thomas, No. 84-3587, slip op. (D.D.C. May 17, 1986). This deadline was later 
extended to December 1, 1987. The order, as extended, also required EPA to promulgate 
regulations by August 1, 1988. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 3-10. 
94 51 Fed. Reg. 1,257 (1986). 
95Id. In March, 1986, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas, while addressing a workshop, 
seemed to indicate a new direction for EPA when he declared that EPA did not accept 
empirical verification that ozone depletion was occurring as a precondition for EPA's decision 
whether to regulate CFCs. He noted that action may be necessary "to avoid letting today's 
'risk' become tomorrow's 'crisis.'" Brodeur, supra note 61, at 86. 
96 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,490 (1987). 
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stratospheric problems, the Clean Air Act calls upon the President 
to seek international agreements to protect the stratosphere,97 and 
the United Nations (UN) eventually focused its environmental pro-
gram on CFCs. 
Although the participation by the UN in international environ-
mental issues dates back to 1949, the UN has played a significant 
role only since 1972. 98 The UN Conference on Human Environment, 
held in Stockholm in 1972, drew international attention to the prob-
lems facing the global environment and led to the establishment of 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).99 In 1976, 
UNEP identified the problem of ozone deterioration as one of five 
areas to receive priority treatment.100 Subsequently, UNEP spon-
sored numerous meetings dealing specifically with the ozone prob-
lem. 101 
After years of negotiation, the international community struck a 
compromise by establishing the Vienna Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer in 1985. lO2 Agreement on the Convention 
had failed because of lack of accord on whether to include a protocol 
imposing a worldwide ban on nonessential aerosol uses of CFCS.103 
The Convention requires parties to (1) cooperate in research and 
scientific assessments of the processes that may affect the ozone 
layer and effects from modification of the ozone layer;104 and (2) 
exchange socioeconomic, commercial, and legal information. 105 Al-
though the Convention failed to agree on any global control mea-
sures, it passed a resolution calling for an economic workshop and 
continued negotiations to culminate in a diplomatic conference. 106 
97 42 U.S.C. § 4256 (1982). 
98 The first United Nations conference on environmental issues was the Scientific Conference 
and Utilization of Resources in 1949. Prior to 1972, the only other environmental conference 
called was the International Conference of Experts of the Scientific Basis for the Rational 
Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere in 1968. See Comment, The Problem 
of Ozone Depletion-Is There an International Legal Solution?, 12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. 
REG. 433, 445 (1987). 
99 I d. at 448. 
100 Id. 
101Id. 
102 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2,1985, printed as Treaty 
Doc. No.9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1985 (ratified by the United States in August 1986) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
103 UNEP Governing Council Reaches Compromise on Protocol for CFCs Under Ozone 
Convention, 8 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 305 (1984). 
104 Vienna Convention, supra note 102, at 24-25. 
l05Id. at 25-26. 
106 Brodeur, supra note 61, at 85. 
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Immediately after agreement was reached on the Vienna Conven-
tion, scientific evidence appeared indicating that the ozone problem 
was worse than previously believed. In June, 1984, scientific data 
presented at a Munich meeting, "Current Issues in Our Understand-
ing of the Stratosphere and the Future of the Ozone Layer," indi-
cated that CFC depletion of ozone was not directly related to CFC 
production. 107 Instead, doubling the amount of CFCs appeared to 
increase depletion by a factor of four to six.108 In May 1985, British 
scientists published reports of large losses of ozone above Antar-
tica.109 By August, satellites of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) had confirmed the British observations and 
mapped an enormous hole in the ozone layer above Antarctica. The 
loss of ozone was nearly sixty percent by October. 110 A NASA report 
funded by UNEP reported that the ozone layer might have already 
decreased 4.9 to 9.4 percent from CFCs and that the destruction 
might be at a faster rate than production of CFCs. III 
Faced with increasing evidence of environmental harm and a sub-
stantial economic interest in CFC production, an international con-
sensus emerged that control measures were necessary, but there 
was not any consensus on what those measures should be. 112 To 
establish controls, several nations, including the United States, 
drafted proposed protocols. 113 The United States urged an immediate 
freeze at current emissions levels, scheduled reductions of up to 
ninety-five percent of emissions, and scheduled regular reassess-
ments of controls based on changing stratospheric conditions. 114 Can-
ada and the Nordic nations advocated similar actions. European 
107 Id. 
lOS EPA To Reconsider Production Rules in Light of New Data on Ozone Depletion, 8 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 349 (June 22, 1984). 
109 Mintzer & Miller, The Ozone Layer: Its Protection Depends on International Coopera-
tion, 21 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 1167 (1987) [hereinafter International Cooperation]. 
110 Brodeur, supra note 61, at 84. 
111 Up to 9.1; Percent Ozone Depletion Predicted in United Nations Report, 9 Chern. Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) 1395 (Jan. 17, 1986). 
112 See U.S. Participation in International Negotiations on Ozone Protocol: Hearings Before 
the House Subcomm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1987) (statement of 
Richard Benedick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Health, Environment, and Natural 
Resources) [hereinafter U.S. Participation]. 
"" Comment, Thinning Air, Better Beware: Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone Layer, 6 
DICK. J. INT'L L. 87, 110 (1987). 
114 Address by R. E. Benedick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment, 
Health, and Natural Resources, before the 1987 Washington Conference on CFCs and Ozone 
Protection Programs (Mar. 25, 1987). The ninety-five percent reduction reflected Senate bills 
calling for a phase-out of ninety-five percent of CFCs. S. 570, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); 
S. 571, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
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nations, Japan, and the U. S. S. R., however, did not support long-
term measures. 115 Nevertheless, despite initial differences, on Sep-
tember 16, 1987 twenty-four nations, including those producing two-
thirds of all CFCs, responded to growing scientific evidence of ozone 
depletion by signing the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer. 116 
IV. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 
The Montreal Protocop17 is an historic agreement because for the 
first time the international community reached agreement on control 
of a valuable economic commodity to prevent future environmental 
damage. 118 More than fifty nations participated in Montreal. 119 
Twenty-four nations, including the United States, signed the Pro-
tocol upon its adoption. 120 Other delegations, including the U. S. S. R., 
expected their governments to sign after reviewing the agree-
ment. 121 Both developed and developing nations played an active role 
in the process of reaching an agreement and signing the Protocol. 122 
A. Controlled Substances 
The Protocol does not place limitations on all CFCs and halons, 
only on those listed as "controlled substances. "123 "Controlled sub-
stances" is defined as any substance listed in Annex A to the Pro-
tocol, whether existing alone or in a mixture. 124 The definition does 
115 U.S. Participation, supra note 112, at 5-6. 
116 OZONE PROTOCOL, S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (1988) [hereinafter 
OZONE PROTOCOL] (statement of Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator). 
117 MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER, TREATY 
Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 47,515, 47,515-19 (1987) 
[hereinafter MONTREAL PROTOCOL] (ratified by the United States on March 14, 1988). 
118 See OZONE PROTOCOL, supra note 116, at 55 (statement of Lee M. Thomas, EPA Ad-
ministrator). 
119 Statement of J. D. N egroponte, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, before the House Comm. on Science, Space and Tech-
nology (October 29, 1987). 
12°Id. 
121Id. 
122Id. The signatories of the Protocol were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway 
Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom, United States, and 
Venezuela. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at K-11 (Appendix K). 
123 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 1, para. 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
124 Id. Annex A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,519. 
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not include any substance or mixture that is in a manufactured 
product other than a container used for the transportation or storage 
of the substance listed. 125 
Annex A lists two groups of substances. Group I consists of CFC-
11, CFC-12, CFC-113, CFC-114, and CFC-115. Group II consists of 
halon-1211, halon-1301, and halon 2402. 126 The parties to the Protocol 
may add or remove any substance from the Annex by a two-thirds 
majority vote of those present and voting. 127 Parties are free to 
regulate substances not included in the Protocol or to take more 
stringent control measures than the Protocol requires. 128 
B. Control Measures 
A basic feature of the Montreal Protocol is the obligation of the 
parties to limit production and consumption of controlled sub-
stances. 129 The Protocol does not, however, limit each controlled 
substance. It does limit the "calculated levels" of production and 
consumption for each Group (I and II) of controlled substances. A 
party to the Protocol may produce any combination of Group I 
controlled substances it chooses as long as the total calculated level 
does not exceed certain limits. All limits are based on the party's 
1986 calculated level of production. 130 
In determining the 1986 calculated level of production, the starting 
point for each nation is its 1986 production. 131 Developed nations may 
add to their 1986 production the production from facilities under 
construction or contracted for prior to September 16, 1987 and from 
125 [d. 
126 There are other CFCs currently being produced. The four major CFCs produced in 
commercial quantities are CFC-11, CFC-12, HCFC-22, and CFC-113. CFC-11 and CFC-12 
account for approximately 80% of production in limited quantities. All halons are being 
produced in relatively small quantities but use is growing rapidly. ASSESSING THE RISKS, 
supra note 2, at 3-5. HCFC-22 is not covered because it has a short atmospheric lifetime and 
is substantially less harmful than the other chemicals. In addition, HCFC-22 is a potential 
substitute for more patent ozone-depleting chemicals. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 
Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,498 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). 
127 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, para. 10, 58 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
128 [d. art. 2, para. 11, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
129 [d. art. 2, para. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515-16. 
130 The year 1986 was chosen as the baseline for controls so that nations did not have an 
incentive to increase their production and consumption during 1987 in order to establish higher 
baselines while the Protocol was being negotiated. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 47,489, 47,496 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). 
131 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art 2, para. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
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facilities provided for in national legislation prior to January 1, 
1987. 132 Such facilities must, however, be completed by December 
31, 1990, and production from them must not raise the party's annual 
calculated level of consumption of controlled substances above 0.5 
kilograms per capita. 133 
Other than this adjustment for 1986, calculated levels of produc-
tion are determined by the annual production of each individual 
controlled substance less the amount of that substance destroyed by 
technologies to be approved by the parties. 134 The resulting figure 
is then mUltiplied by the ozone depleting potential assigned to that 
controlled substance. A substance's ozone depleting potential is an 
arbitrary mUltiple contained in Annex A of the Protocol to give each 
controlled substance a weighted factor corresponding to its destruc-
tive effect on ozone. 135 
For example, CFC-ll has an ozone depleting potential of 1.0 while 
CFC-1l5 has a potential of 0.6. Thus, production of one kilogram of 
CFC-ll would count nearly twice as much against a party's calcu-
lated level of production as production of one kilogram of CFC-1l5. 
This multiplication process is repeated for each controlled substance 
in a Group. The sum of the products for each Group is the calculated 
level of production. 136 The calculated level of production for Group I 
controlled substances may be represented as equalling: 
[(1.0) (kg CFC-ll)] + [(1.0) (kg CFC-12)] + [(0.8) (kg CFC-1l3)] + 
[(1.0) (kg CFC-1l4)] + [(0.6) (kg CFC-1l5)]. 
Calculated levels of consumption are determined by adding calcu-
lated levels of imports and subtracting calculated levels of exports 
from the calculated level of production. 137 
132Id. art. 2, para. 6, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. This would, for example, allow the Soviet 
Union to include in its 1986 base year the expanded production foreseen in its 5 year plan. 
OZONE PROTOCOL, supra note 116, at 4. Under article 5, developing nations are granted an 
exemption from controls under certain conditions. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
133 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, para. 6, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. For 
purposes of comparison, 1985 United States per capita consumption of CFCs was 0.84 kilo-
grams. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, app. D, D-5. 
134 Production is defined in article 1 to exclude any amount destroyed. MONTREAL PROTOCOL, 
supra note 117, art. 1, para. 5,52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
135 See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
136Id. art. 2, para. 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
137 Calculated levels of imports and exports are determined by multiplying the annual 
tonnage by the appropriate ozone depletion potential. After January 1, 1993, any export of 
controlled substances to non-parties will not be subtracted in calculating the consumption level 
of the exporting party. Id. art. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
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Parties will implement control measures through a series of sched-
uled freezes and reductions in the production and consumption of 
CFCs and halons. 138 The freezes will proceed as follows: 
On July 1, 1989, a freeze on Group I substances will be put in 
effect. For the twelve month period commencing July 1,1989,139 and 
every twelve month period thereafter, each party's annual calculated 
level of consumption of Group I controlled substances must not 
exceed its calculated level of consumption for 1986. 140 Similarly, a 
party's annual calculated level of production of Group I controlled 
substances must not exceed its calculated level of production for 
1986 with three exceptions. 
The first exception allows parties that are developing countries 
and whose annual calculated level of consumption of controlled sub-
stances is, and remains, less than 0.3 kilograms per capita to delay 
compliance with the Protocol by ten years from the date otherwise 
specified. 141 The other exceptions pertain to parties that are devel-
oped countries. These parties may exceed their 1986 calculated levels 
of production by as much as ten percent to satisfy the basic domestic 
needs of developing countries that are parties to the Protocol. 142 In 
addition, they may exceed that level for purposes of industrial ra-
tionalization between parties. 143 Industrial rationalization is the 
transfer of all or a portion of a party's calculated level of production 
to another party in order to achieve economic efficiency or to avoid 
shortfalls in supply caused by plant closures. 144 Article 2 of the 
Protocol permits any party whose calculated level of production of 
Group I controlled substances was less than twenty-five kilotons to 
138Id. art. 2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
139 If the Montreal Protocol did not enter into force on January 1, 1989, these controls will 
commence with the seventh month after the date the Protocol enters into force. Id. art. 2, 
para. 1, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,515. 
14°Id. 
141 The 1986 consumption of developing countries was low in comparison to developed 
countries. By allowing developing countries to increase their consumption to 0.3 kilograms 
per capita and allowing developed countries to increase production to supply the developing 
countries, the drafters of the Protocol hoped to encourage developing countries to join the 
Protocol. The drafters hoped that these actions would make it unnecessary for them to build 
or expand any capacity for producing controlled substances in order to supply for a limited 
period of time their growing domestic needs. Protection of Statospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 
47,489, 47,496-97 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). 
142 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, para. 1, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
143Id. 
144Id. art. 1, para. 8, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
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transfer or receive production for purposes of industrial rationali-
zation. 145 
A freeze on Group II substances will go into effect on January 1, 
1992. For the twelve month period commencing January 1, 1992,146 
and every twelve month period thereafter, each party's annual cal-
culated level of consumption of Group II controlled substances may 
not exceed its calculated level of consumption for 1986. 147 The annual 
calculated level of production of those substances may not exceed 
the nation's calculated level of production for 1986 except that such 
level may be exceeded: (1) to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
parties that are developing countries (but not by more than ten 
percent of the 1986 figure); or (2) for purposes of industrial ration-
alization between parties. 148 
A twenty-percent reduction on Group I substances will go into 
effect on July 1, 1993. For the twelve month period commencing 
July 1, 1993,149 and annually thereafter, each party's calculated level 
of consumption of Group I controlled substances may not exceed 
eighty percent of its calculated level of consumption for 1986.150 Each 
party's calculated level of production of Group I substances for those 
periods may not exceed eighty percent of its calculated level of 
production for 1986 except: (1) to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
developing countries, in which the case the limit may be exceeded 
by not more than ten percent of the 1986 calculated level of produc-
tion; or (2) for industrial rationalization purposes. 151 
A fifty-percent reduction in Group I substances will become effec-
tive on July 1, 1998. For the twelve month period commencing July 
1, 1998,152 and annually thereafter, each party's calculated level of 
consumption of Group I controlled substances may not exceed fifty 
percent of its calculated level of production for 1986 except: (1) to 
145 Industrial rationalization would allow, for example, United States producers to maintain 
production beyond allowed consumption levels in order to supply Canadian users if small 
Canadian plants were closed for inefficiency as a result of controls. OZONE PROTOCOL, supra 
note 116, at 4. 
146 If the Montreal Protocol did not enter into force on January 1, 1989, these controls will 
commence with the thirty-seventh month after the date the Protocol enters into force. MON-
TREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, para. 2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
147 [d. 
148 [d. 
149 This reduction takes effect on July 1, 1993 regardless of when the Protocol enters into 
force, so long as the Protocol does enter into force by that date. 
150 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, para. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515-16. 
151 [d. 
152 This reduction takes effect on July 1, 1998 regardless of when the Protocol enters into 
force, so long as the Protocol enters into force by that date. 
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satisfy the basic domestic needs of developing countries, in which 
case the limit may be exceeded by not more than fifteen percent of 
the 1986 calculated level of production; or (2) for industrial ration-
alization purposes. 153 
C. Trade with Non-Parties 
The trade provisions in Article 4 are the other key feature of the 
Protocol. These provisions seek to limit emissions of CFCs and 
halons by restricting trade with countries that are not parties. To 
accomplish this objective, the Protocol requires parties to impose 
the following specific restrictions on the trade of ozone-depleting 
products with non-parties: l54 
(1) Within one year of the Protocol entering into force, each party 
must ban the import of controlled substances from any state not a 
party to the Protocol. 155 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1993, no developing country under Ar-
ticle 5 of the Protocol may export a controlled substance to any state 
not a party to the Protocol. 156 
(3) Within three years of the Protocol entering into force, the 
parties must create an annex listing products containing controlled 
substances. Absent objection to the list, within one year of the annex 
becoming effective the parties must ban import of those products 
from any state not a party to the Protocol. 157 
(4) Within five years of the Protocol entering into force, the parties 
must determine the feasibility of banning or restricting imports of 
products produced with, but not containing, controlled substances. 
If feasible, an annex will be developed and parties not objecting to 
the list will effect such bans or restrictions within one year of the 
annex's effective date. 15s 
Parties have an additional precatory trade obligation to discourage 
the export to non-parties of technology that would facilitate the 
l~j MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 3, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
154 Nations that do not join the Protocol by complying fully with its terms are exempted 
from operation of the trade bans. Id. art. 4, para. 8, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. Because Taiwan 
is no longer a member of the United Nations, it cannot become a party. It is likely, however, 
that Taiwan will abide by the Protocol's control measures and reporting provisions to avoid 
the trade controls. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at K-14 (Appendix K). 
155 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516-17. 
1"'; [d. Beginning January 1, 1993, no party to the Protocol that takes advantage of the 
special provisions in article 5 permitting a ten-year delay in compliance may export controlled 
substances to non-parties. 
157Id. 
1'" Id. 
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production or utilization of controlled substances. 159 Finally, parties 
must refrain from providing financial assistance to non-parties for 
exports of products, equipment, plants, or technology that would 
facilitate the production of controlled substances. 160 
The purpose of the trade provisions is to induce countries to 
become parties to the Protocol and to reduce CFC and halon emis-
sions by those who remain non-parties. CFCs and halons can be 
traded in three general forms: as bulk chemicals, as chemicals con-
tained in end-user products, and as products made with, but not 
containing, CFCs. Products that contain CFCs include automobiles, 
refrigerators, and air conditioners. Electronic components and con-
sumer goods are examples of products that are made with, but do 
not contain, CFCS.161 
Industrialized countries are the largest producers and consumers 
of CFC and halon bulk chemicals and of CFC end-user products. 162 
These countries are self-sufficient producers and net exporters of 
CFC and halon bulk chemicals. 163 Their participation in the Protocol 
is thus particularly important. Few such industrialized countries 
could afford not to join the Protocol because their CFC-related prod-
ucts would be banned by other industrialized countries that were 
parties to the Protocol. 164 These countries can afford the transition 
costs of developing and adopting alternative chemicals and industrial 
processes not using CFCs or halons. Companies in these countries 
are already working to develop substitutes and many have patents 
on potential substitute chemicals and technologies. 165 
Use of CFCs in non-industrialized, developing countries has con-
tributed to the overall growth of global CFC use and increased use 
in those countries is expected. 166 Newly industrialized countries have 
economies in which the production of manufactured goods is signifi-
cant and growing. These countries produce CFCs, but primarily for 
domestic use. 167 An import ban by industrialized countries on bulk 
15" Id. 
160 Id. 
161 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at K-2 (Appendix K). The value of the 
CFCs contained in or used to manufacture these products is very small compared to the value 
of the products themselves. Id. 
162Id. at K-13 (Appendix K). 
16:< Id. 
164 Id. Twenty-two industrialized countries participated in the Montreal Protocol negotia-
tions. Of those, nineteen either signed the Protocol or were members of the European 
Economic Community that signed. 
165Id. 
166Id. at D-l (Appendix D). 
167 Newly industrialized countries producing CFCs include Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Argentina. Id. at K-13 (Appendix K). 
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chemicals would have limited impact on them. Many of their ex-
portable products, however, contain CFCS.168 The possibility of re-
strictions on export of these products creates a strong incentive for 
them to join the Protocol in order to maintain exports and export 
earnings. Membership would allow continued access to the markets 
of other parties. 169 
Large, developing countries like China, India, and Indonesia are 
significant users of CFCs, but per capita use is much smaller than 
in industrialized countries. 170 Industrial use of CFCs in large, de-
veloping countries is similar to that in newly industrialized countries. 
Most CFC end-user products manufactured in these countries have 
been for domestic use. In recent years, however, these large devel-
oping countries have attempted to increase their manufactured ex-
ports, spur the technological growth and sophistication of these in-
dustries, achieve greater economies of scale and production 
efficiencies, and earn needed foreign exchange. l7l India, for example, 
has a domestic electronics industry and China has been trying to 
expand its electronics industry. The Protocol's trade provisions could 
impair the continued near-term growth of CFC end-user industries 
and perhaps the technological development of CFC end-user indus-
tries. 172 The attractiveness of joining the Protocol for large devel-
oping countries will depend on whether they continue to implement 
development strategies based on export-led growth of manufactured 
goods. 173 
The least developed countries are the smallest users of CFCS.174 
They generally have no domestic production capacity and do not 
produce CFC-related products. 175 For them, CFC use is limited to 
imports of CFCs contained in products or used to manufacture prod-
ucts. Consequently, the potential effects of the Protocol's trade pro-
visions are less important to them than they are to other countries. 
Many least developed countries have little immediate economic in-
centive to participate because of the trade provisions. 176 A greater 
168 Although production of these goods is partly for domestic markets, exports to industrial-
ized countries has been increasing. Id. at K-14 (Appendix K). 
169Id. at K-14 (Appendix K), D-29 (Appendix D). 
17°Id. at K-16 (Appendix K). 
171 Id. at D-32 (Appendix D). 
172 Id. 
173Id. at K-16 (Appendix K). The ten year grace period permitting per capita consumption 
to rise to 0.3 kilogram could further their development strategy. 
174Id. 
175 There are some exceptions. For example, Thailand exports air conditioners, and nations 
in the Caribbean basin are attempting to establish electronic assembly industries. Id. at D-30 
(Appendix D). 
176 Id. at K-16 (Appendix K). The trade provisions would have some negative effect on those 
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incentive to join may result largely from environmental and political 
considerations. For example, membership could result in a more 
favorable international image and strengthened foreign relations. 177 
In summary, the Protocol's trade provisions could impair the ex-
port of manufactured goods by a non-party when it has successfully 
increased exports in recent years or is attempting to increase exports 
in the future. The cost of lost export earnings to these countries 
could be high. Retaining access to the markets of industrialized 
countries therefore provides a strong incentive for such countries to 
join. 178 
D. Reports 
Within three months of becoming a party to the Montreal Protocol, 
countries must provide statistical data on production, imports, and 
exports of each controlled substance for the year 1986. 179 If actual 
data is not available, best possible estimates must be submitted. 180 
Each party is also required to provide annual statistical data on . 
production, destruction, imports, and exports of each controlled sub-
stance. The reports must be submitted within nine months of the 
end of the year in which the party becomes a member and annually 
thereafter. 181 Within two years of the Protocol entering into force 
and every two years thereafter, each party is required to submit a 
summary of activities it has conducted for the promotion of technol-
ogies to reduce CFC and halon emissions, the development of pos-
sible alternatives to controlled substances or products containing 
them, and the generation of public awareness of the environmental 
effects of emission of controlled substances. 182 
E. Assessments and Adjustments 
The Protocol is not intended to be a static agreement. It sets out 
a schedule for controls based on scientific knowledge at the time it 
countries either currently attempting to, or considering, the development of domestic CFC 
end-user products. [d. at D-32 (Appendix D). 
177 Nineteen of the least developed countries participated at Montreal. Six signed the final 
Protocol. The number could increase because some of the representatives were not authorized 
to sign at Montreal. [d. at K-16 (Appendix K). 
178 Developing countries not party to the Protocol have the option of trading amongst 
themselves. Historically, however, such trade has been a small part of their activity and has 
dealt largely with primary products. Even if these countries are not parties, they could 
assimilate technologies as they become available and target such technologies for parties. 
179 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 7, para. 1,52 Fed. Reg. at 47,517. 
180 [d. 
lHl [d., art. 7, para. 2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,517. 
182 [d. art. 9, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,517. 
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was drafted. It also specifically provides for panels of experts to 
report on scientific, environmental, technical, and economic devel-
opments. 183 Beginning in 1990 and at least every four years there-
after, the parties to the Protocol will assess its control measures 
based on such reports. 184 
Based on these updated assessments of the control measures, 
parties may change the ozone depleting potentials listed in Annex A 
or may impose further reductions of production or consumption from 
1986 calculated levels. 185 Although the Protocol states that such 
changes should be made by consensus, a decision may be adopted 
by a two-thirds majority of parties present and voting, provided it 
represents nations responsible for at least fifty percent of the total 
consumption of controlled substances of the parties. 186 
The parties may also decide to remove or add substances from an 
annex and to specify control measures applicable to those substances. 
Such changes must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of those 
present and voting without regard to their total consumption. 187 
In addition to these assessments and adjustments, Article 2 of the 
Protocol contains specific requirements in order to alter the Proto-
col's scheduled fifty-percent reduction of controlled substances. l88 
Such a change must be agreed to by a two-thirds majority of the 
parties present and voting, provided it represents at least two-thirds 
of the total calculated level of consumption of those substances by 
all parties. 189 
F. Entry Into Force 
The Protocol enters into force on January 1, 1989 if certain con-
ditions are fulfilled: (1) the Protocol must be ratified by eleven or 
more states or regional economic integration organizations; (2) those 
ratifying the Protocol must represent at least two-thirds of the 1986 
estimated global consumption of controlled substances; and (3) the 
Vienna Convention must first enter into force. 19o Should these con-
[83 Statement of J.D. Negroponte, supra note 119. These reports are issued one year prior 
to the parties' assessment of control measures. MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 
6, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,517. 
[84 [d. 
[85 [d. art. 2, para. 9(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
[86 [d. art. 2, para. 9(c), 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
[87 [d. art. 2, para. 10, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
[88 Id. art. 2, para. 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,516. 
[89 [d. 
[00 [d. art. 16, para. 1, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,518. The Vienna Convention has been ratified by 
the required number of nations and entered into force on September 22, 1988. 
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ditions not be fulfilled by January 1, 1989, the Protocol enters into 
force on the ninetieth day following the date on which all conditions 
are fulfilled. As of October 1, 1988, all major producers of CFCs had 
signed the Protocol, and nine nations had ratified it. 191 
V. EPA REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 
The Montreal Protocol does not specify how its production and 
consumption limitations are to be met. Each party to the Protocol 
has discretion to choose its own method. EPA has published two 
rules in order to implement the Protocol in the United States: one 
rule for collection of the United States 1986 production and con-
sumption data 192 and a second rule that would implement the Pro-
tocol's substantive requirements. 193 
Congress did not enact any special enabling legislation for these 
regulations. Both rules are issued under statutory authority granted 
in the Clean Air Act. 194 EPA's authority to require information on 
1986 production, consumption, imports, and exports of CFCs and 
halons is contained in section 114 of the Clean Air Act. 195 The Act 
empowers the Administrator to "require any person who owns or 
operates an emission source or is subject to any requirement of this 
chapter . . . to . . . provide such other information as he may rea-
sonably require. "196 Likewise, authority to regulate CFCs and halons 
is contained in section 157(b) of the Clean Air Act. 197 
Based on its assessment of the scientific evidence, EPA "believes 
that the [Montreal] Protocol's requirements are an appropriate re-
sponse to the potential ozone depletion problem at this time"198 and 
"that implementation of the Protocol would best protect public health 
and welfare from the adverse effects of any ozone depletion. "199 
191 More Controls Than Required by Protocol Needed to Protect Ozone Layer, Thomas Says, 
12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 950 (Sept. 30, 1988) [hereinafter More Controls Needed]. 
192 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,486, 47,488 (1987) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. § 82.20). EPA published the final rule without notice or opportunity for public 
comment. The statute authorizes this procedure when there is good cause to find that notice 
and public comment on the rule would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982). 
193 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,598-602 (1988) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.1-82.14). 
194 52 Fed Reg. 47,486; 53 Fed. Reg. 30,568. 
195 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982). 
196Id. § 7414(1)(E). 
197Id. § 7457(b); see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
198 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,486, 47,498 (1987). 
199Id. 
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Accordingly, the regulations replicate the requirements of the Mon-
treal Protocol. They regulate the same controlled substances over 
specified control periods,20o specify the same staged freezes and re-
ductions,201 and restrict trade to comply with the Protocol. 202 More-
over, the regulations become effective only after the Protocol enters 
into force. 203 
A. 1986 Calculated Levels 
EPA has required producers, importers, and exporters of the 
controlled substances listed in Annex A of the Protocol to report the 
amount (in kilograms) of each controlled substance: (1) produced in 
the United States or its territories in 1986, (2) used and entirely 
consumed as a chemical intermediary in the production of other 
chemicals in 1986,204 (3) imported into the United States or its ter-
ritories in 1986 (including the date, port of entry, and country of 
origin), and (4) exported from the United States or its territories 
(including the date, port of exit, country of destination, and date of 
arrival at destination).205 This information was required by January 
200 Controlled substances are listed in Appendix A to Part 82. 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,523. They 
are identical to those in Annex A of the Protocol. 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,519. EPA has clarified 
the difference between a controlled substance in a container and a controlled substance in a 
manufactured product other than a container. A controlled substance includes any listed 
substance or mixture that is not part of a use system containing the substance. If the listed 
substance must be transferred from a bulk container to another container, vessel, or piece of 
equipment in order to realize its intended use, the first container is utilized only for storage 
and/or transport and the substance or mixture is considered to be in bulk form and not a 
product. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,598 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.3(g». EPA will designate 
control periods once the Protocol enters into force. Should there be a discontinuity between 
the timing of the Group I freeze and the twenty-percent reduction (that is, under the Protocol, 
the end of the last twelve-month freeze may not end precisely when the first twelve-month 
period of reduction begins), EPA will promulgate dates for the last control period of the freeze 
so that it overlaps with the twenty-percent reduction period. Id. at 30,580. 
201 The Protocol's twenty-percent and fifty-percent reductions are implemented by adjusting 
the amount of apportioned baseline production and consumption rights granted in specified 
control periods (for example, eighty percent for control periods between July 1, 1993 and June 
30, 1998). 53 Fed. Reg. 30,599-600 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.7). 
202 Importation of controlled substances from non-parties is prohibited beginning one year 
after the Protocol enters into force. Id. at 30,599 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(d». 
Exports to non-parties after January 1, 1993 are discouraged by denying additional consump-
tion rights. Id. at 30,601 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.1O(b». See infra note 249 and 
accompanying text. 
203 53 Fed. Reg. 30,598 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.2). 
204 This information is necessary to avoid counting CFC or halon production more than once. 
205 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,488 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 82.20). 
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13, 1988.206 The information obtained provided the basis for deter-
mining the calculated levels of production and consumption in the 
United States for 1986,207 an essential part of the regulatory scheme. 
B. Regulatory Approach 
Before settling on a regulatory approach, EPA considered three 
economic incentive approaches as well as several engineering con-
trols and product bans.208 The economic incentive approaches use 
higher CFC and halon prices to provide incentive for firms to reduce 
their use of those chemicals. 209 Higher prices should cause firms that 
can make relatively low-cost reductions to do so. 
One of these economic incentive approaches provided for the auc-
tion of CFC permits to any interested party.210 The permit would 
allow a firm to produce a specified amount of CFCs during a specified 
control period,211 the number of permits auctioned determined by 
the permissible calculated levels for each group of controlled sub-
stances. 212 Revenues from the auctions would go to the United States 
Treasury.213 It would not be permissible to hold permits for use in a 
later control period because such use could result in a violation of 
the Protocol in a future year.214 The trading of permits, however, 
would be permissible. 215 
Another economic incentive approach involved setting production 
quotas based on regulatory goals. 216 The quotas would be allocated 
to the five domestic CFC producers and the approximately ten 
United States importers based on their share of the market in 
1986.217 Quotas could not be saved for use in a future year but could 
be traded among producers and importers for use in the same control 
year. 218 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 47,487. 
208 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 11-1. 
2091d. 
210 See id. at 11-2 to 11-6. 
211 Id. 
2121d. at 11-3. 
2131d. at 11-2. 
214 I d. at 11-4. 
215 I d. at 11-5. 
216 I d. at 11-6. 
2171d. at 11-7. 
2181d. at 11-6 to 11-8. 
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The third economic incentive approach considered by EPA in-
volved the use of regulatory fees. 219 EPA would assess fees against 
the regulated chemicals to encourage reduced usage,220 basing the 
amount of those fees on the chemical's ozone depletion potential and 
the permitted calculated levels of CFCs. 221 A margin for error would 
be included to assure the target goal is met. 222 Revenues would go 
to the United States Treasury.223 
EPA also considered developing specific engineering control mea-
sures requiring targeted CFC-user industries to reduce their con-
sumption. 224 EPA could, for example, ban the use of CFC-blown 
packaging, require additional recovery and recycling from solvent 
users of CFCs, and require recycling of CFCs used in sterilization. 225 
EPA could select control options based on pertinent societal consid-
erations such as available technologies, cost of reductions, and quan-
tity of reductions. A hybrid of these engineering controlslbans and 
of allocated quotas made up a fifth approach that EPA considered. 226 
EPA assessed each of these approaches against specific evaluation 
criteria: environmental protection, economic efficiency, equity, ad-
ministrative feasibilty, legal certainty, incentives for innovation, and 
compliance and enforcement. 227 Regulatory fees lack certainty in 
accomplishing the degree of environmental protection required by 
the Protocol because users might decide to continue use at higher 
prices. 228 In addition, fees were considered to be of questionable 
legality because EPA would be raising revenues in excess of the 
costs of operating the program. 229 Auctioned permits, like fees, were 
considered legally questionable because of the revenues produced. 230 
Like regulatory fees, engineering controlslbans may also fail to meet 
environmental protection goals because growth in unregulated uses 
could offset any gains in regulated industries. 231 Furthermore, con-
219 See id. at 11-9 to 11-10. 
220 [d. at 11-9. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. at 11-9 to 11-10. 
223 [d. at 11-9. 
224 [d. at 11-10. 
225 [d. 
226 [d. at 11-11 to 11-12. 
227 [d. at 11-1. 
22B See id. at 11-14. 
229 [d. at 11-22. The legal issue was whether EPA has authority under the Clean Air Act 
to collect revenues in excess of the costs of operating a program. [d. 
230 [d. at 11-22. 
231 [d. at 11-14. 
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troIs and bans would provide incentives for innovation only to tar-
geted industries.232 The hybrid system was seen as sacrificing some 
economic efficiency233 and raised potential administrative and en-
forcement burdens. 234 
Because concerns over environmental protection and legality could 
undermine the program and administrative costs of controls and bans 
could be high, EPA chose the allocated quota approach.235 The sole 
identified drawback to the allocated quota approach was that CFC 
and halon producers and importers might realize substantial profits 
as a result of the scarcity created by regulation. 236 Moreover, the 
allocated quota approach provides economically efficient reductions, 
involves minimal administrative costs, does not raise potential legal 
issues, and is the most easily enforced option. 237 
C. Production and Consumption Levels 
Consumption is defined in the regulations as it is in the Protocol: 
production plus imports minus exports. 238 Therefore, production and 
consumption allowances largely, but not entirely, overlap. Produc-
tion allowances and consumption allowances would not be equal un-
less the 1986 calculated level of imports was equal to the 1986 cal-
culated level of exports. Even if the two were equal, additional 
production and consumption are permitted under certain circum-
stances and could change the ratio. To the extent that exports exceed 
imports, production would exceed consumption, and, to the extent 
that imports exceed exports, consumption would exceed production. 
For example, if there were one hundred units of production, five 
units of imports, and ten units of exports, the level of consumption 
would be only ninety-five units. 
Because the regulations must ensure compliance with the Protocol 
provisions limiting both production and consumption, they create 
separate production allowances and consumption allowances.239 The 
regulations apportion calculated levels of baseline production allow-
ances to any person who produced one or more controlled substances 
in the United States during 1986.240 The apportionment is equal to 
232 [d. at 11-17. 
233 [d. at 11-16. 
234 [d. at 11-21. 
235 [d. at 11-24. 
236 See id. at 11-17. 
237 [d. 
238 MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,515. 
239 53 Fed. Reg. 30,599 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.5-82.6). 
240 [d. 
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that person's calculated level of production of Group I and Group II 
controlled substances during 1986.241 The regulations allocate base-
line consumption allowances to persons who produced and/or im-
ported one or more controlled substances into the United States in 
1986.242 The apportionment is equal to the calculated level of Group 
I and Group II controlled substances produced and/or imported in 
1986 minus the amount of each controlled substance exported in 
1986.243 
Accordingly, the regulations prohibit the production of a calculated 
level of controlled substances in excess of the amount of unexpended 
production allowances held at that time for that period. 244 Similarly, 
the regulations prohibit the production of a calculated level of con-
trolled substances in excess of the amount of unexpended consump-
tion allowances held at that time for that period.245 The consequence 
of these dual prohibitions is that, while consumption allowances alone 
are sufficient to allow importation of controlled substances, both 
production and consumption allowances are necessary in order to 
produce a quantity of controlled substances. 246 
Both additional consumption and additional production allowances 
are possible under the regulations. Additional consumption allow-
ances may be granted upon proof of export of a controlled substance 
during the control period.247 Such exports may be to any country 
prior to January 1, 1993. After that date, they must be exported to 
a party to the Protocol in order to qualify for additional allowances. 248 
For purposes of apportioning consumption allowances, a shipment is 
considered an export upon its departure from the United States.249 
241 [d. Because allowances are issued in terms of calculated levels of Group I or Group II 
controlled substances, holders of allowances could decide on any mix of controlled substances 
in a group. The Montreal Protocol left the ozone depletion potential of Halon 2402 for later 
determination. EPA has determined 6.0 to be scientifically justified and has included this 
figure in the regulation. [d. at 30,602 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82, app. A). 
242 [d. at 30,599 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.6). 
243 The apportionment for controlled substances produced in the United States, as opposed 
to imported, must be multiplied by a correction factor. The correction factor reduces each 
share in proportion to the United States' 1986 exports of controlled substances that cannot 
be accurately or verifiably attributed to specific producers. Stratospheric Ozone Protection: 
Apportionment of Baseline Consumption and Production Rights, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,801 (1988) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed May 24, 1988). 
244 53 Fed. Reg. 30,599 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(a». 
245 [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(b». 
246 [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(c». 
247 [d. at 30,600 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.10). 
248 [d. 
249 Stratospheric Ozone Protection: Apportionment of Baseline Consumption and Production 
Rights, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,804 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed May 24, 
1988); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 30,600 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.10). As originally 
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Additional production allowances may be obtained in two ways. 
The first method is by "converting" allocated "potential production 
allowances."25o All producers who are apportioned baseline produc-
tion allowances are granted a calculated level of potential production 
allowances equal to ten percent of their baseline apportionment (fif-
teen percent for Group I controlled substances beginning July 1, 
1998).251 Producers may convert these potential allowances to pro-
duction allowances by exporting controlled substances to parties to 
the Protocol. 252 
The second way of obtaining additional production allowances is 
to accept the transfer of a calculated level of production from a party 
to the Protocol producing less than twenty-five kilotons of controlled 
substances (a twenty-five-kiloton party).253 The United States pro-
ducer must obtain from the party's principal diplomatic representa-
tive in the United States a document stating that the twenty-five-
kiloton party will decrease its production by the amount it is trans-
ferring to the recipient. 254 Upon receipt of a copy of the document 
and of complete information concerning the transfer, EPA will notify 
the Protocol Secretariat and issue a notice granting production al-
lowances equivalent to the calculated level of production trans-
ferred. 255 
proposed, EPA required the export to arrive at its destination before additional consumption 
allowances could be granted. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,521 (1987) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). EPA reasoned that deducting 
exports from consumption before their ultimate arrival could result in mass exports by parties 
at the end of control periods in order to stay within Protocol consumption limits. Because 
these exports would not arrive until the next control period, they would avoid being counted 
against any party and contribute to greater consumption of controlled substances than the 
Protocol allows. Requiring exports to arrive at their destination as a condition precedent to 
additional consumption rights may impose some burdensome time restraints on the industry 
to fully utilize its rights within a control period. In addition, even if no party had to account 
for the end-of-the-control period exports in that control period, parties would have to count 
them against consumption limits in the next control period. [d. 
250 53 Fed. Reg. 30,600 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.9). 
251 [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.9(a), (b)). 
252 [d. at 30,601 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.11). Exporters must submit a request for 
authority to convert potential production allowances to production allowances. If approved, 
EPA will issue a notice authorizing conversion of a specific quantity of potential production 
allowances. The authorization will be valid only during the control period in which the con-
trolled substances arrived at the party importing them. Any controlled substance exported 
also provides a basis for obtaining additional consumption allowances. See supra note236 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, consumption rights in the same amount and for the same 
control period are granted whenever EPA issues a notice authorizing conversion of potential 
production rights. [d. 
253 See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,600 (1988) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 82.9). 
254 See id. 
255 [d. Note that consumption allowances are not transferred and remain with the twenty-
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D. Transfers 
As originally proposed, any person could transfer to any other 
person consumption allowances, production allowances, potential 
production allowances, or authorization to convert potential produc-
tion allowances by submitting a request for the transfer to EPA. 256 
If EPA's records indicated that the transferor possessed unexpended 
allowances or authorization in the amount to be transferred, a notice 
of transfer would be issued to the transferor and transferree. 257 
Such a provision makes the system more economically efficient. If 
the owner of an allowance cannot produce as much value by using 
the allowance as another person, he or she would have incentive to 
sell it. Transferable allowances should come into the possession of 
those persons able to produce the most value with them. In its final 
rule, however, EPA omitted the transfer provisions and reserved 
the matter for later decision and implementation. 258 
E. Record Keeping and Reporting 
The regulations impose a variety of record keeping and reporting 
requirements upon producers, importers, and exporters. These doc-
uments provide a paper trail that permits EPA to monitor all aspects 
of compliance. For example, all producers must apprise EPA of how 
production will be measured on a daily basis and how this data will 
be used to determine quarterly production. 259 Producers must also 
maintain dated records of the quantity of each controlled substance 
produced at each facility, the quantity of controlled substances used 
as a feedstock, the quantity of HCFC-22 and CFC-116 produced 
within each facility, the quantity of certain raw materials and feed-
stock chemicals used, the shipment of controlled substances pro-
duced at each plant, and the quantity of controlled substances re-
covered at each plant. 260 In addition, a producer must submit 
quarterly reports to EPA on production of each controlled substance 
for each facility it owns, on the total calculated levels of production 
of Group I and Group II controlled substances for each facility for 
five kiloton party. It is also possible for a United States producer to transfer allowances to a 
twenty-five kiloton party. See id. 
256 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,522 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 82.12). 
257 [d. EPA's involvement would assure that mistaken or fraudulent transfers do not cause 
the United States to violate the Protocol. 
258 See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,601 (1988) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 82.12). 
259 See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.13(f)(1)). 
260 See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.13(f)(2)). 
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the quarter and the control period, and on shipments of each con-
trolled substance from each facility in that quarter. 261 
Importers of controlled substances must maintain records showing 
the quantity of each controlled substance imported, the date im-
ported, the port of exit and entry, the country from which each 
substance was imported, the commodity code, the importer number 
for the shipment, a copy of the bill of lading, an invoice, and the 
United States Customs Service Entry Summary Form. 262 On a quar-
terly basis, importers must provide EPA with a report summarizing 
the information in their daily records, including the total quantity 
(kilograms) of each controlled substance imported during the previ-
ous quarter, the calculated level of Group I and Group II controlled 
substances imported during the quarter and since the beginning of 
the control period, and the importer's total expended and unex-
pended consumption allowances at the end of the month. 263 
Requests for additional consumption allowances or for conversion 
of potential production allowances must be accompanied by all nec-
essary information concerning exports. 264 For exports not resulting 
in such a request, the exporter must report to EPA within forty-
five days of the end of the control period in which the exports left 
the United States. In that report, the exporter must identify the 
parties, the exporter's employee identification number, the type and 
quantity of the controlled substance exported, including what per-
centage was recycled or used, the date and port from which the 
substances were exported, the country to which they were exported, 
and the commodity code of the controlled substance shipped. 265 
F. Users 
It is important to note that no consumption allowances are re-
quired to use CFCs or halons. In fact, users of controlled substances 
are not involved with production allowances, consumption allow-
ances, record keeping, or reporting.266 Consumers will continue to 
rely on their supply channels, but are likely to encounter price 
261 See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82. 13(f)(3)). The complete monthly report has 
additional requirements. See id. 
262Id. at 30,602 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82. 13(g)). 
263 Id. 
264 See id. at 30,600-01 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.10-82.11). 
265Id. at 30,602 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82. 13(h)). 
266 See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,485, 47,501 (1988) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). 
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increases because of the limited production. 267 These higher costs 
should provide incentive to find ways to avoid the use of controlled 
substances or to recover and recycle them. 268 Higher prices encour-
age timely development of low-cost reductions, thereby substantially 
improving the overall costs and efficiency of complying with the 
Protocol. 269 
G. Enforcement 
EPA will monitor compliance by reviewing the submitted reports 
and by inspecting sites. 27o The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to 
pursue injunctive relief, criminal prosecutions, or civil penalties of 
up to $25,000 per day for each violation.271 The regulations provide 
added bite to civil penalties by narrowly defining what constitutes a 
violation. 272 Each kilogram of a controlled substance produced in 
excess of production allowances or in excess of consumption allow-
ances constitutes a separate violation. 273 Likewise, each kilogram 
imported from a non-party also constitutes a separate violation. 274 
Furthermore, the regulations provide that any producer who fails 
to maintain the required records and reports may be assumed to 
have been producing at full capacity during the period for which 
records or reports were not kept. 275 The result of this approach is 
to allow EPA to impose substantially greater civil penalties, thus 
discouraging violations. 
H. Fees 
The regulations do not provide for fees. EPA is, however, consid-
ering imposition of a fee on producers and importers to offset the 
cost of administering the regulatory system. 276 The Independent 
267 See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 11-17. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
270 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (1982). This provision empowers the Administrator or his authorized 
representative to enter production, import, or export facilities; to inspect such facilities; and 
to have access to any records maintained. See id. 
271 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982). 
272 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,599 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 82.4). 
273 See id. 
274 [d. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(d)). 
275 [d. at 30,602 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.13(f)(4)). 
276 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,505 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 82) (proposed Dec. 14, 1987). 
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Offices Appropriation Act277 permits federal agencies to recover the 
fair costs of services or things of value provided to a recipient. An 
agency may recover costs as long as it has identified the specific 
activities for which the fee is being assessed, the service provided 
produces a private benefit, the value of the benefit is reasonably 
related to the fee, the benefit accrues at least in part to an identifiable 
private beneficiary and not to an entire industry, and the service 
produces no independent public benefit.278 
Accordingly, EPA considered a fee to recover the full costs of: (1) 
determining the amount of baseline production and baseline con-
sumption allowances apportioned to specific producers and import-
ers; (2) processing applications for additional production allowances 
and associated actions; (3) processing applications for additional con-
sumption allowances; (4) processing applications for transfers of al-
lowances; and (5) processing and maintaining reports submitted to 
EPA.279 In its final regulations, however, EPA concluded that sub-
stantial agency resources would not be required to operate the al-
located quota program, and omitted provision for payment of any 
administrative fees. 280 
VI. LOOKING AHEAD 
A. New Scientific Evidence 
Since the discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica in 1985, two 
national ozone expeditions have studied the phenomenon. In addi-
tion, NASA formed an Ozone Trends Panel in collaboration with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Federal 
Aviation Agency, the World Meteorological Organization, and the 
UNEP. The Panel involved more than one hundred scientists who 
critically analyzed all ground-based and satellite data concerning 
stratospheric ozone. 281 The results of these studies indicate that the 
277 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982). A public agency normally may exact a fee for a grant which 
bestows a benefit on an applicant not shared by other members of society. National Cable 
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974). 
278 Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 777 F.2d 722, 730 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
279 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,506. 
280 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,592 (1988). EPA found that the costs 
of operating the fee program would be a substantial share of the total costs of the program. 
281 NASA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE OZONE TRENDS PANEL 1 (1988) [hereinafter 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
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amount of ozone depletion in the atmosphere was underestimated 
prior to 1988.282 
The Antarctic ozone hole was a surprise. Computer models had 
not predicted its existence. In 1987, National Ozone Expedition II 
determined that the Antarctic ozone hole results from both unique 
meteorological conditions and high concentrations of chlorine in the 
atmosphere. 283 This expedition positively established the link be-
tween chlorine in the atmosphere and the destruction of ozone, a 
fact essential to support more stringent regulation. 284 
The polar vortex that begins forming over Antarctica in August 
creates conditions that are conducive to such an interaction between 
ozone and chlorine. For example, between August 15th and October 
13th of 1987, ozone concentration at fifteen kilometers above Ant-
arctica decreased by more than ninety-five percent.285 In the region 
four to six kilometers in altitude, the ozone was ninety to ninety-
eight percent less than normal. The ozone level cannot get any lower 
in that altitude. It already has been virtually destroyed,286 and the 
ozone hole is now evident over the tip of South America. 287 In 1987, 
this region of low-column ozone over Antarctica lasted until late 
November or early December, the longest since the region was first 
detected.288 
The hole disappears as the polar vortex breaks down and strato-
spheric ozone from elsewhere in the southern hemisphere replaces 
the ozone that has been destroyed. 289 The amount of ozone thus 
destroyed each year by the Antarctic phenomenon is potentially of 
2H2 See, e.g., Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,493. EPA projected that 
even in the absence of CFC regulation and with a high CFC growth rate, total column ozone 
depletion would not exceed 1.02 percent by the year 2000. Id. CFC models assuming a freeze 
of CFC emissions at 1987 rates had predicted global ozone depletion of a few percent in a 70-
year time frame. Weisburd, Ozone Reports Stir Debate, 133 SCI. NEWS 20 (1988). 
283 Implications of the Findings of the Expedition to Investigate the Ozone Hole Over the 
Antarctic: Joint Hearing on S. 385 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection and 
the Subcormn. on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987) [hereinafter Implications] (statement 
of Dr. Robert Watson, NASA). 
2'" Id. at 14 (statement of Dr. James Anderson, Harvard University). 
2H5 Id. at 10 (statement of Dr. Robert Watson, NASA). 
2So Id. at 11 (statement of Dr. Robert Watson, NASA). 
287 Id. at 47 (statement of Dr. Peter Wilkniss, Director, Division of Polar Programs, National 
Science Foundation). 
2"" Stratospheric Ozone Decreases Measurably in Northern Hernisphere, Ozone Report Says, 
11 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1,933 (1988) rhereinafter Ozone Report]. 
289 Implications, supra note 283, at 46 (statement of Dr. Peter Wilkniss, Director, Division 
of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation). 
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considerable global significance.29o In fact, ozone appears to have 
decreased since 1979 by five percent or more at all latitudes south 
of sixty degrees south throughout the year. 291 
In addition to the losses above Antarctica, analysis of satellite 
measurements began yielding reports of significant global ozone 
losses elsewhere. 292 On March 15, 1988, the Ozone Trends Panel 
reported that stratospheric ozone over the northern hemisphere 
(between 53 degrees south and 53 north latitudes) decreased 2.5 
percent between October 1978 and October 1985.293 Consequently, 
in light of new scientific data about Antarctica and mid-latitude ozone 
depletion, protection of the environment and public health in the 
United States and other countries will require a much more rapid 
phase-out of CFCs than previously believed. 
B. Compliance with the Clean Air Act 
EPA maintains that the proposed regulations fulfill its responsi-
bility under section 157(b) of the Clean Air Act to protect strato-
spheric ozone as needed to protect public health and welfare. EPA 
also maintains that the regulations meet the requirements of an 
agreement settling a lawsuit brought by the Natural Resources 
Defense Council seeking to compel EPA to promulgate regulations 
under section 157(b).294 Both legal conclusions are subject to debate 
because of a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the regula-
tions and because EPA failed to consider available scientific evidence 
in its risk assessment. 295 
By its own assessment, EPA has found that CFCs and halons 
deplete ozone and that such depletion will result in increased cancers, 
cataracts, damage to plants and aquatic organisms, and increased 
ground-level ozone. 296 It has also found that a fifty-percent reduction 
290 [d. at 14 (statement of Dr. James Anderson, Harvard University). 
291 Ozone Report, supra note 288, at 1,933. 
292 See, e.g., Bowman, Global Trends in Total Ozone, 239 SCIENCE 48,49 (1988). 
293 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 281, at 3 (1988); Ozone Report, supra note 288, at 
1,933. 
294 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,490 (1987). 
295 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)-(D) (1982). 
296 See generally ASSESSING THE RISKS, supra note 2; Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 
52 Fed. Reg. at 47,491-95; see supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. Even discounting 
the Antarctic ozone hole, the United States position in the negotiations leading to the Protocol, 
a position in which EPA participated and supported, was that available data on depletion of 
stratospheric ozone supported a 95 percent phase-out. Ozone Layer Depletion: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1987) (statement of Lee Thomas, Administrator, EPA) 
[hereinafter Ozone Layer Depletion]. 
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by the United States alone would reduce ozone depletion by one half 
by the year 2075. 297 Having made such a determination, an issue 
arises as to whether the Administrator of EPA then has discretion 
to regulate the substances causing ozone depletion. Section 157(b) 
provides that the Administrator "shall" propose regulations for the 
control of any substance which in his or her judgment may reason-
ably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere so as to endanger 
human health. 298 The statutory language must normally be regarded 
as conclusive. 299 
This language gives the Administrator broad latitude in determin-
ing whether harm to the stratosphere or to human health is reason-
ably anticipated. The statute clearly permits regulation before harm 
occurs. It does not follow, however, that the Administrator has 
complete discretion in deciding to regulate. The plain meaning of the 
word "shall" connotes a nondiscretionary duty. Thus, while Admin-
istrators could avoid making a determination that would trigger the 
duty to regulate, when they do assess the risks and determine that 
harm is likely, they must regulate to reduce these risks. 
As required, the Administrator has now promulgated regulations. 
The Administrator has made them effective, however, only upon the 
occurrence of a particular event, an event that is beyond the control 
of the United States and unrelated to the degree of human endan-
germent posed. The regulations become effective only when the 
Montreal Protocol becomes effective. 30o Furthermore, in promulgat-
ing the regulations, EPA did not consider the scientific evidence 
concerning the Antarctic ozone hole or global ozone depletion.301 
Congress conditioned domestic regulation on EPA's determination 
that a substance could reasonably be anticipated to affect strato-
spheric ozone so as to endanger public health. Clearly, it cannot be 
297 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,499 (1987) (Table 4). 
29" 42 U.S.C. § 7457(b) (1982). 
299 Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The 
legislative history of section 157(b) does not explain the use of "shall." The conference report 
does state that "EPA may promulgate regulations to protect the stratospheric ozone layer if 
the Administrator finds that public health or welfare may reasonably be anticipated to be 
endangered." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 147, reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1528. This language implies a purely discretionary 
function, but whether such discretion flows from the Administrator exercising his or her 
judgment and how it relates to the obligatory "shall propose" is not explained. This one 
isolated comment cannot be construed as a clear legislative intent contrary to the statutory 
language. 
aoo 53 Fed. Reg. 30,598 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82.2). 
301 EPA made a de facto assumption that the Antarctic ozone hole was not related to CFCs 
and halons. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,492 (1987). 
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the case that this condition is met if the Protocol goes into force but 
will not be met if the Protocol does not. Except for establishing a 
required minimum level of regulation, the Protocol does not change 
EPA's duty.302 To regulate only if required by treaty is not consistent 
with EPA's role and the congressional mandate to protect human 
health and may well be subject to challenge as not being in accor-
dance with the law. 303 The condition reflects EPA's decision to seek 
an international solution to ozone depletion and to avoid unilateral 
action. 304 
In promulgating its regulations, EPA did not consider data con-
cerning the Antarctic ozone hole or evidence of global ozone deple-
tion. 305 If this information were taken into account, it would reveal 
substantially accelerated ozone depletion. Consequently, there would 
be substantially increased health and environmental damage at all 
times, and substantially increased total damages. The net benefits 
from each level of control, including monetary benefits, would in-
crease dramatically because total health and environmental damage 
over the period would be higher and much more damage would occur 
earlier. The value of controls would also be less affected by discount-
ing. 
Even though this evidence was available before final regulations 
were promulgated, EPA chose not to include it in their risk analysis. 
At the proposal stage, they cited uncertainty as the basis for this 
decision, but there are at least two other reasons why they did not 
supplement their risk assessment with the significant new informa-
tion. First, it takes a significant amount of time to develop a risk 
assessment and to proceed through the rulemaking steps. There may 
have been insufficient time to accomplish these actions so as to still 
ensure United States compliance with the Protocol. Second, EPA is 
302 Ratification of the Protocol by the United States and its entry into force make it a binding 
treaty obligation that supersedes any earlier federal law inconsistent with it. To that extent, 
the Protocol becomes a lower limit, a floor, for United States regulation of listed CFCs and 
halons. 
303 Conditioning regulation upon the entry into force of the Protocol cannot be justified by 
42 U.S.C. § 7456 (1982) as part of an undertaking for international agreement. That provision 
envisions the domestic regulations as driving the international agreements and not vice versa. 
On the other hand, while this provision may not be in accordance with the law, at this point 
there appears to be no harm occassioned by it. The Vienna Convention has entered into force, 
all major CFC-producing nations have signed the Protocol, nine nations have ratified the 
Protocol, and there is every expectation that it will enter into force on January 1, 1989. More 
Controls Needed, supra note 191, at 950. 
304 See Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 296, at 97 (statement of Lee Thomas, Adminis-
trator, EPA). 
305 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,493 (1987). 
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committed to an international solution to the ozone problem. Should 
a revised risk assessment result in more stringent United States 
regulations without an international agreement, it might weaken 
prospects for further international negotiations. 
EPA's decision not to jeopardize implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol by delay for reassessment of risk is both reasonable and 
prudent from the perspective of the Protocol. It makes less sense, 
however, from the perspective of EPA's responsibilities under the 
Clean Air Act. 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, EPA is required to report annually 
to Congress on the actions taken to regulate halocarbon emissions, 
the results of regulations, and the need for additional action, if any. 306 
At this time, EPA should be conducting a meaningful reassessment, 
not one that is stacked against unilateral United States action. In 
its 1987 regulatory impact analysis, for example, the only scenario 
analyzed for United States action beyond the Protocol's required 
levels was an eighty-percent reduction by the year 2003. In addition, 
the analysis assumed no other country would join the United States 
action. 307 Because studies show that the environmental and health 
damage will be greater and occur sooner than previously anticipated, 
a new analysis should show greater benefits from immediate United 
States action beyond the Protocol's levels. More realistic scenarios 
with a phased ninety-five percent reduction by the United States 
and other concerned countries, beginning immediately and com-
pleted over a shortened time period, are needed for EPA and Con-
gress to address their duties to protect public health and welfare 
responsibly. 
C. Allocated Quotas 
EPA's allocated quota approach ensures United States compliance 
with the Montreal Protocol. Because there are only five producers 
of CFCs in the United States, and ten or so importers, quotas are 
also the simplest and least expensive approach to regulate CFCs. 
As implemented, however, such quotas have noteworthy shortcom-
ings. 
One shortcoming results from the fact that CFCs and halons are 
useful chemicals. Without regulation, demand for such chemicals 
306 42 u.s.c. § 7455 (1982). 
307 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 10-9. 
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would continue to increase. 308 Any program designed to limit supply 
without limiting demand will created a scarcity, thus causing prices 
to rise. Indeed, EPA is counting on price increases to be the means 
by which the market will efficiently determine how the available 
controlled substances are used. Because EPA will distribute pro-
duction and consumption rights on a gratis basis, the revenues from 
higher prices will accrue to the holders of those rights. EPA esti-
mates the total revenue to producers could range from $2 billion to 
$5.7 billion for the eleven years from 1989 to 2000. 309 Everyone, with 
the possible exception of CFC producers, recognizes the inequity of 
giving valuable market rights to the very persons who profited while 
creating the ozone problem and who opposed and delayed earlier 
regulatory action. More appropriately, the revenues generated 
should go to those who will suffer from the damage wrought to the 
ozone layer, the world's present and future population. 310 
An even more important concern than equity is the very real 
possibility that allocated quotas may reduce producers' economic 
incentive for innovation. While higher prices to users will give them 
incentive to conserve or find substitutes for CFCs, the EPA's grant 
of a monopoly to CFC and halon producers creates a CFC-cartel and 
increases the profitability of controlled substances. As a result, al-
though the best solution to the problem of ozone depletion is finding 
substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, producers have no incen-
tive to find such substitutes because the large profits from CFC and 
halon production will disappear when substitutes become available. 
Producers handed windfall profits would thus be discouraged from 
maximizing efforts on research, development, and introduction of 
substitutes. Such a loss of incentive will result if the same producers 
owned the substitute technology, if they were in a position to control 
the availability of substitutes by slowing the pace of testing, or if 
they could deter new producers of substitutes from entering the 
market. 
EPA considered two approaches that would have transferred the 
windfall profits from CFC and halon producers to the United States 
Treasury. Both also would have assured that producers had the same 
308 Statistics from the International Trade Commission reflect United States production of 
CFC-12 increased by 14 percent in 1986 and production of CFC-11 increased by 24 percent in 
1986. Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 296, at 114. 
309 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,506. 
310 Such revenues could be used to fund research on ozone depletion, to find chemical 
substitutes, or to find ways to reduce the biological harm that will result from depletion. 
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incentive as users for innovation. Both approaches were, however, 
found to be legally questiop..able. 311 
Another shortcoming is that allocated quotas without engineering 
controls312 could result in some industries not taking available, low-
cost options in a timely manner. Such a result is particularly likely 
when the cost of CFCs is only a relatively small portion of the total 
cost of the product, such as a car or computer. To ensure cost-
efficient control of CFCs and halons, then, some engineering controls 
may be necessary. 
D. Auctions and Fees 
Auctions and fees transfer the profit from price increases from 
industry to the government. By doing so, they create a market 
incentive to develop substitutes by placing the risks and rewards of 
developing such CFC and halon substitutes on industry. 
Three statutory authorities may enable EPA to auction CFC pro-
duction and halon rights or to impose regulatory fees on such rights. 
Section 157 of the Clean Air Act grants EPA broad regulatory 
authority to protect the public health. 313 The legislative history of 
this provision reveals that Congress intended EPA to consider eco-
nomic effects and social impacts of the methods employed to regulate 
and that Congress did not want to "tie the Administrator's hands or 
confer an authority which is cumbersome or unduly difficult to use, 
administer, or enforce."314 
TSCA315 grants similar power to EPA. While TSCA is normally a 
residual statutory authority, it would permit regulation of CFCs and 
halons if the Administrator determines that it is in the public interest 
to protect against the risks that those substances pose. 316 TSCA also 
grants broad authority to prohibit or limit production of substances 
and leaves the methods of implementation to EPA's discretion. More-
over, its legislative history reflects congressional concern about ex-
cess profits occurring under limited production: 
[I]f the Administrator chooses to impose a production limitation 
on any chemical substance, such limitation, if not carefully 
311 See supra notes 229, 230 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
313 42 U.S.C. § 7457 (1982); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
314 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 101, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1180. 
315 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
316 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (1982). 
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drawn, could produce monopoly profits. The conferees believe 
that the Administrator should consult with the Attorney General 
and Federal Trade Commission in order to avoid any anticom-
petitive consequences. 317 
Finally, the Independent Offices Appropriation Act318 allows agen-
cies to promulgate regulations that establish charges for a "service 
or thing of value" provided by the agency.319 The charges must be 
fair and based on the costs to the government, the value of the 
service or thing to the recipient, the public interest served, and 
other relevant factors. 32o Concerns over the legality of auctions and 
fees arise from cases interpreting this Act, however. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court has cautioned that unlimited discretion by agen-
cies in setting fees would be an unconstitutional delegation of Con-
gress's power to tax. 321 
In the leading case, National Cable Television Association v. 
United States,322 the Court struck down a thirty cent-per-subscriber 
charge, distinguishing fees from taxes. Fees connote some benefit 
and are incident to voluntary acts, such as a request for a permit. 323 
Taxes have no necessary relationship to benefits received, may be 
based on ability to pay, and may be designed to serve public policy. 324 
The Court held that the proper measure of a fee is the value of the 
service to the recipient. 325 Consistent with that holding, and on the 
same day, the Court in Federal Power Commission v. New England 
Power Company326 struck down charges on utilities to finance the 
Federal Power Commission's regulatory activities because there was 
no nexus between the charges and the benefits received by specific 
companies. 327 The Court emphasized the lack of identifiable recipi-
ents of the benefits. 
Subsequent to the National Cable Television decision, a number 
of lower courts have suggested that any charge in excess of the 
government's expense in providing the benefit is invalid. For in-
317 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1679, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4491, 4560. 
318 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982). 
319 See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text. 
320 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982). 
321 National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974). 
322 Id. 
323Id. at 340-41. 
324Id. 
325Id. at 342-43. 
326 415 U.S. 345 (1974). 
327Id. at 351. 
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stance, the D.C. Circuit established three constraints in setting fees: 
the fee may not exceed agency costs of providing the service; the 
fee must be reasonably related to, and may not exceed, the value of 
the service to the recipient, regardless of the agency's costs; and, 
when the agency activity produces an independent public benefit, 
the agency must reduce the fee by that portion of the costs attri-
butable to that public benefit. 328 In addition, where the agency in 
question served the public interest, the D.C. Circuit held that fees 
based in part on public policy would be considered a tax rather than 
a fee. 329 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit found that an agency may recover full 
costs of services provided an identified beneficiary but may not 
charge general management costs and other expenses not incurred 
in the agency action. 330 Like the D. C. Circuit, the Court of Claims 
held that a fee must not unreasonably exceed the value to the recip-
ient. Rather, the fee should be a reasonable approximation of the 
attributable costs incurred by the agency. 331 
It appears that none of the lower court decisions turned on the 
central issue identified by the Supreme Court of whether the charges 
can reflect the value of the benefit received. Acting cautiously, EPA 
chose to avoid the possibility of a successful legal challenge based 
on the distribution of CFC and halon production rights. This choice 
is understandable because a successful challenge would result in 
overturning the distribution mechanism and could lead to United 
States violations of its treaty obligations under the Protocol. 
E. Labeling 
The regulations make no provision for labeling, even though la-
beling products containing or manufactured with CFCs and halons 
is inexpensive and is the least burdensome form of regulation. A 
label similar to the labels presently required for aerosols containing 
CFCS332 would be consistent with the market-oriented approach of 
the CFC and halon regulations. The public has a right to know that 
a product contains ozone-depleting substances and a right to express 
328 Central & S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 777 F.2d 722, 729 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). It is important to note that any challenge to nationally applicable regulations promul-
gated under the Clean Air Act may only be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982). 
329 National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
330 Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 933 (10th Cir. 1983). 
331 Yosemite Park and Curry Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 925,932 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
332 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1987). 
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a choice for or against such substances. Given the information, con-
sumers might prefer substitute products not containing CFCs and 
halons. Using CFCs could be viewed as a marketing disadvantage, 
such a disadvantage operating as an effective incentive toward sub-
stitution and moving the market in the desired direction. 
F. Revising the Protocol 
The delegates at Montreal were instructed not to consider the 
Antarctic phenomenon in their deliberations. 333 The Protocol, how-
ever, makes specific provisions for revision should circumstances 
warrant it. 334 Because the environmental and health damage will be 
greater and will occur sooner than previously anticipated, the Pro-
tocol's reduction schedule can no longer be considered a proportion-
ate, adequate response. 
The Executive Director of UNEP, Dr. Mostaba Tolba, pledged to 
call an emergency session to reopen the Protocol if scientists discov-
ered that the Antarctic hole is caused by CFCS.335 This session must 
occur as soon as the Protocol is ratified. The amount of chlorine in 
the atmosphere has already more than doubled during the time that 
decisionmakers were waiting for further investigation of ozone de-
pletion by CFCS.336 That chlorine will stay in the atmosphere for 
approximately one hundred years. The Antarctic hole, for example, 
will persist for one hundred years even if nations immediately ban 
the release of CFCS.337 The present Protocol will not even reduce 
the amount of chlorine entering the atmosphere until 1993.338 Even 
with an eighty-five percent reduction in 1994, as opposed to the 
Protocol's twenty-percent reduction, the amount of chlorine in the 
atmosphere will continue to increase into the twenty-first century. 339 
333 OZONE PROTOCOL, supra note 116, at 11 (statement of Sen. Baucus); Implications, supra 
note 283, at 18 (statement of Dr. Michael McElroy, Harvard University). 
334 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text. 
335 Implications, supra note 283, at 4 (statement of Sen. Chafee). 
336 See id. at 21 (statement of Dr. Sherwood Rowland, University of California). Current 
global capacity for producing CFC-11 and CFC-12 is about 1,245 million kilograms each year. 
International Cooperation, supra note 109, at 1,168. 
337 Implications, supra note 283, at 18 (statement of Dr. Michael McElroy, Harvard Uni-
versity). 
338Id. at 20; see also MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, art. 2, 52 Fed. Reg, at 47,515-
16. 
339 See Implications, supra note 283, at 21 (statement of Dr. Sherwood Rowland, University 
of California). 
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In addition to providing inadequate reductions of chlorine, the 
Montreal Protocol does not specify controls on some commercially 
available CFCs such as CFC-13 and CFC-112.340 Reportedly, com-
panies in the United States and Japan are pushing CFC-112 as a 
substitute for the CFCs on the list of controlled substances. No 
progress in preventing ozone-depletion will be made if producers can 
simply substitute one ozone-depleting substance for another, switch-
ing to a substitute not on the list. 341 The Protocol must thus be 
expanded to include these ozone-depleting substitutes. 
G. Unilateral Action 
There has been, and continues to be, a debate in this country over 
whether the United States should take unilateral action to reduce 
CFCs. On one hand, EPA has steadfastly disfavored unilateral action 
and has even delayed compliance with the Clean Air Act in order to 
accommodate that view. No country dominates the emissions or the 
utilization of CFCs to such a degree that its actions alone can solve 
the ozone problem. 342 The United States accounts for only about 
twenty-five percent of worldwide CFC production and consump-
tion. 343 Accordingly, EPA maintains that only a global agreement 
can truly safeguard the ozone layer. Unilateral action by the United 
States could also cause some United States firms to move to non-
regulating countries, resulting in a loss of United States jobs.344 
Moreover, unilateral action could lessen the urgency of the situa-
tion. 345 Other nations, seeing the United States reducing emissions, 
would lose incentive to take action. That lack of incentive, according 
to EPA's Administrator, is what happened in 1980 with aerosol 
regulations. 346 
On the other hand, the United States and other concerned coun-
tries can make a difference. The United States is the largest pro-
ducer and consumer of CFCs. While a twenty-five percent reduction 
340 See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, supra note 117, Annex A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 47,519. 
341 Implications, supra note 283, at 20 (statement of Dr. Sherwood Rowland, University of 
California). 
342 See Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 296, at 97 (statement of Lee Thomas, Adminis-
trator, EPA). 
343 OZONE PROTOCOL, supra note 116, at 19. 
344 Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 296, at 97 (statement of Lee Thomas, Administrator, 
EPA). 
345 I d. at 115. 
346 OZONE PROTOCOL, supra note 116, at 19. 
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may not be enough to solve the ozone problem, such a reduction 
demonstrates good faith and leadership.347 In fact, because the sit-
uation is worse than originally believed, unilateral action by the 
United States would have a greater impact than EPA projected.348 
In addition to providing the impact of unilateral action, the United 
States can also use its position as the world's largest economic mar-
ket to leverage other countries. The trade implications brought to 
bear by the United States would be far greater than those raised by 
the aerosol bans. 349 Inaction by the United States, the world's largest 
producer, would discourage other countries from regulating beyond 
the Protocol and might signal diminished urgency. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the past several years, EPA has been parrying attempts by 
environmental groups and legislators to force regulations of CFCs 
under the Clean Air Act's provisions for protection of public health. 
EPA successfully delayed domestic action until international mea-
sures were achieved and, undoubtedly, will attempt to continue 
putting off further domestic regulation to pursue a more stringent 
international agreement. Only revising the Protocol, congressional 
action, or a court order will move EPA to action. 
Certainly, a global response is preferable to unilateral action by 
fewer nations. As soon as the Montreal Protocol is ratified by the 
requisite number of nations, the United States must seek reassess-
ment and a revised reduction schedule with deeper and faster re-
ductions of nearly all ozone-depleting substances. At the same time, 
however, the United States must prepare an alternative strategy in 
the event the Protocol is not ratified or no agreement to toughen 
the Protocol is reached. 
Furthermore, the United States should allow the parties to the 
Protocol only a reasonable time to agree on more stringent controls 
before taking unilateral action. Considering the likely damage from 
continued degradation of the ozone and the high cost of delaying 
regulatory action, the United States should pursue more stringent 
domestic controls with concurrent trade restrictions if the parties 
347Id. (statement of Sen. Kerry). EPA estimates that the United States now contributes 
30 percent of worldwide CFC emissions. As developing countries increase consumption, the 
United States percentage might well decrease. See 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988). 
348 See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
349 Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and Chlorofluorocarbons: Joint Hearings on S. 201 Before 
the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection and the Subcomm. on Hazardous Wastes and 
Toxic Substances of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 280 (1987) (statement of Senator John H. Chafee). 
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have not reached agreement by the end of 1989. 350 Such trade re-
strictions will protect industry and encourage other nations to join 
the United States. Such action may also provide impetus for the 
Protocol amendments. Considering what is at stake and the reluct-
ance of some nations to regulate, it would be irresponsible for EPA 
to be unprepared for a possible failure to agree on amendments to 
the Protocol. 
Industry spokespersons have said that they think substitutes could 
be brought on line within five years. 351 That period would be a 
reasonable time-frame for the ninety-five percent phase-out consis-
tently urged by the United States. Such deep reductions in CFC use 
in the United States are possible without disrupting the economy 
and curtailing the use of valuable products only if industry develops 
safe chemical and product substitutes that can be put on the market 
at reasonable prices as soon as possible. 
There is currently little incentive to develop such substitutes. 
Under the present Protocol, there are no mandatory reductions until 
1993 and prices may not rise sufficiently to encourage reductions or 
alternatives. In fact, producers stand to profit from CFC shortages 
so long as there are no substitutes on the market. Accordingly, 
without waiting for further Protocol negotiations, the market must 
be given incentive. The price of CFCs must be high to reflect the 
value of production and consumption allowances. The price must be 
high not just to users of CFCs, but to producers and importers as 
well. High prices will promote efficient use of CFCs, stimulate in-
troduction of alternative, safer CFC formulations, and encourage 
the development of technologies employing non-CFC substitutes. 
Congress should specifically authorize the auction of consumption 
and production allowances, the imposition of regulatory fees for the 
commercial value of consumption and production allowances, or the 
creation of a windfall profits tax to capture excess profits from the 
granting of consumption and production allowances without charge. 
As the EPA Administrator has pointed out, "[i]f we wait for ozone 
depletion to occur before reducing CFC emissions, any depletion 
would continue to worsen for several decades. "352 Depletion has 
occurred. The United States no longer has the luxury of waiting for 
greater scientific certainty or ensuring protection of the domestic 
350 An immediate phase-out spreads economic transition over a period of time. If the United 
States delays further, it risks finding out that the situation is so serious that the chemicals 
must be phased out at once causing far greater economic disruption. 
351 U.S. Participation, supra note 112, at 18-89. Patents are already out on substitute 
products in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France. [d. 
352 Ozone Layer, supra note 296, at 95. 
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CFC industry. It is time to take a stand, whether alone or to-
gether. 353 
353 On July 30, 1988, EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to 
develop possible regulations to remedy potential windfall profit consequences of the final rule. 
EPA is also considering engineering controls to assure that available low cost reductions occur. 
See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (1988). On September 20, 1988, 
EPA issued a report stating that even with a 50 percent reduction in CFCs, there would be 
a quadrupling of 1987 chlorine levels in the atmosphere. EPA Study Recommends Phaseout 
ojCFCs, Other Chlorine Compounds By End oj Century, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1,082,1,083 
(1988). EPA has recommended the complete phase-out of CFCs by the year 2000. Id. at 1,082. 
Among other recommendations, EPA recommended complete fulfillment and extension of the 
Montreal Protocol. Id. at 1,083. It remains to be seen whether international negotiation 
constitutes an initial strategy to gain cooperation or EPA's complete agenda. 
